Victorian Tort Liability for Workplace Injuries by Stein, Michael Ashley
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2008
Victorian Tort Liability for Workplace Injuries
Michael Ashley Stein
Copyright c 2008 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Stein, Michael Ashley, "Victorian Tort Liability for Workplace Injuries" (2008). Faculty Publications. Paper 106.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/106
VICTORIAN TORT LIABILITY FOR 
WORKPLACE INJURIES 
Michael Ashley Stein* 
The first decision of an injured worker suing his master for a 
workplace accident was reported in 1837, the year of Queen Victoria's 
ascension. The second Workman's Compensation Act, a comprehen-
sive social insurance scheme, was passed in 1900, a few months before 
her death. The Article provides an initial account of the development 
of employers' liability to their servants for work-related injuries dur-
ing the Victorian era. It demonstrates that English judges, and espe-
cially the Barons of the Exchequer, interpreted the law to resist em-
ployers' liability. The means these judges used included creating the 
defence of common employment, widely applying the doctrines of as-
sumption of the risk and contributory negligence, quashing nearly 
every innovative attempt to create law favourable to labourers, and 
avoiding House of Lords precedent that supported a limited form of 
liability. The Article argues that the dominant influence of political 
economy as an intellectual schema provides the most complete ac-
count of why Victorian judges acted in this manner. It also demon-
strates that the three leading rationales for the parallel development of 
American tort law (judicial restraint, the invisible hand hypothesis, 
and the subsidy theory) fall short as explanations. By setting forth the 
first comprehensive treatment of the evolution of English em-
ployer/employee liability, the Article provides a comparative perspec-
tive into the debate over the development of American tort law, and 
challenges its reinterpretation. The considerable weaknesses of the 
traditional historical explanations for the development of tort law 
when applied to the English context suggest that they may not be as 
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ity. Many thanks to Charles Donohue, Mary Dudziak, Richard Epstein, George Fisher, Lawrence 
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Sharfstein, Jed Shugerman, and Brian Simpson for their comments. I benefited from presenting this 
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strong for the American context. The Article demonstrates that his-
torical inquiries are important for understanding novel applications 
of traditional legal doctrines to rapidly changing technological cir-
cumstances. Many of the same dilemmas faced by English judges in 
the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution are being reprised for con-
temporary American jurists. Understanding how a previous genera-
tion of judges approached similar jurisprudential quandaries, as well as 
what motivated their decisions, lends insight to modern-day struggles 
with these dilemmas. 
"And was Jerusalem builded here, among these dark Satanic 
Mills?"1 
INTRODUCTIONt 
Seeking support for passage of the 1847 Ten Hours Bill, a measure to 
reduce the workday of women and children factory workers, trade union 
leaders arrived unannounced at the home of the foreign secretary, Lord 
Palmerston. Nonplussed, Palmerston remonstrated that such legislation 
surely was unnecessary. The lot of factory workers, he was certain, had im-
proved immeasurably since the advent of machinery "which does all the 
work." In response, the labourers pushed together a pair of large lounge 
chairs and invited his Lordship to push them around the drawing room. 
Thoroughly winded after managing only a few circumlocutions, and then 
only with the aid of his footman, Palmerston was informed that children in 
factories were expected to handle much the same load daily for thirty miles. 
Taken aback, the foreign secretary ardently championed the legislation.2 
The change in Lord Palmerston's outlook was unusual. With rare 
exception, privileged British gentlemen, including those sitting the judi-
cial bench, had even less practical insight or empathy into the condition 
of the working classes and saw the world through their own sociallenses.3 
They adhered rigorously to notions of political economy, the intellectual 
milieu that dominated the Victorian elite's worldview. Central to this 
schema, as inspired by Adam Smith's classical economic theories, was a 
fervent belief in the absolute ability of individuals to determine their own 
employment terms in the benevolent conditions of a thriving laissez-faire 
1. WILLIAM BLAKE, Milton: A Poem in Two Books (1804), reprinted in THE COMPLETE 
POETRY AND PROSEOFWILLIAM BLAKE 95 (David V. Erdman ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1982). 
t Victorian-era cases throughout this Article are cited to their original reporters. Although all 
quotes are taken from the original reporters, where cases appear in substantially similar form in Eng-
lish Reports, a parallel cite to English Reports is provided. Finally, English spelling conventions are 
followed throughout.- Ed. 
2. JASPER GODWIN RIDLEY, LoRD PALMERSTON 293-94 (1970). Palmerston also favoured less 
progressive ideas; for instance, he was strongly nostalgic for the days when Naval discipline included 
flogging. /d. at 49-52. 
3. I do not wish to overstate the point. Labour had its sympathisers, among who numbered so-
cial reformers like the philanthropist Lord Ashley and the progressive mill owner Robert Owen. 
However, these individuals were few, far between, and rarely blue-blooded. Two judicial exceptions 
are set forth, infra Part II.B.2. 
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market where contract was sacrosanct. By logical extension, political 
economy also condoned replacing home-based charitable relief with de-
grading workhouses as an incentive to cure poverty, and embracing 
Thomas Malthus's dour determination that starvation was the inevitable 
and appropriate consequence of overpopulation. That practical applica-
tion of these beliefs adversely affected the most socially and economi-
cally vulnerable members of society was either unknown or beside the 
point: individuals were solely responsible for their own fate. 
Victorian notions of political economy in relation to workers were 
nicely summed up in a letter published by the redoubtable Baron Bram-
well. Having held steadfastly to laissez-faire principles for more than half a 
century, Lord Bramwell railed openly against what he held to be the 
abominable creation of limited workers' rights through promulgation of the 
1880 Employer's Liability Act: "No one could doubt that the dangers of an 
employment are taken into account in its wages," he wrote with complete 
assurance; moreover, creating liability for workplace injuries engendered 
by fellow servants was so "contrary to principle, unjust, unreasonable," that 
he "cannot suppose anything so outrageous."4 Rather, it would be far bet-
ter "to make servants liable to their masters for the damage caused" 
through their negligence.5 
It was against this tide of intellectual, social, and judicial belief that in-
jured workmen or their survivors sought to establish employer/employee 
liability over the course of Victoria's reign.6 The first reported decision of 
an injured servant suing his master for a workplace accident was announced 
in 1837, the year of the Queen's ascension; the second Workman's Com-
pensation Act, which provided comprehensive social insurance for occupa-
tional harm, was passed in 1900, a few months before her death. Between 
those two events, and inspired by their deep belief in political economy, 
English judges doggedly resisted the enlargement of employers' liability. 
This Article s~ts forth an initial analysis of the development of mas-
ter/servant tort duty for work-related injuries during Queen Victoria's 
reign.7 It demonstrates how English judges, and especially the Barons of 
the Exchequer, interpreted the law to prevent employers' liability from 
emerging. The means used to preclude the growth of accountability in-
cluded creating the defence of common employment, widely applying the 
doctrine volenti non fit injuria (also called assumption of the risk), eschew-
4. GEORGE WILLIAM WILSHER (BARON) BRAMWELL, EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY: LETrER FROM 
LORD JUSTICE BRAMWELL TO SIR HENRY JACKSON 11, 16, 13 (1880). 
5. /d. 
6. With rare exception, actions were brought by, or on behalf of, injured or deceased male em-
ployees. Accordingly, the pervasive use of the male gender pronoun in this Article is intended to 
point out that sexist aspect of Victorian society, and especially the legal convention that only men had 
standing to assert claims. 
7. An earlier examination of legislative responses is P.W.J. BARTRIP & S.B. BURMAN, THE 
WOUNDED SOLDIERS OF INDUSTRY: INDUSTRIAL COMPENSATION POLICY 1833-1897 (1983). 
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ing innovative attempts to extend existing duties to workers, and avoiding 
House of Lords precedent that supported limited liability. 
The Article argues that Victorian judges acted this way because of 
the dominant influence of political economy as an intellectual schema. It 
also demonstrates that the three leading rationales for the parallel devel-
opment of American tort law supplement our knowledge, but have sig-
nificant shortcomings. Judicial restraint, the notion that judges only ap-
ply existing precedent, cannot explain why jurists proactively created 
defences to bar workers claims. The invisible hand hypothesis, which as-
serts that the common law evolves towards economically efficient rules, 
lacks empirical support and is contrary to existing evidence. The subsidy 
theory, which claims that the judiciary transformed compensation rules 
to nurture nascent industries, arrives too late in the English industrial cy-
cle and flies in the face of extensive liability judges fostered against rail-
ways. By setting forth the first comprehensive treatment of the evolution 
of English employer/employee liability, the Article provides a compara-
tive perspective into the debate over the development of American tort 
law and challenges its reinterpretation. The considerable weaknesses of 
the traditional historical explanations for the development of tort law 
when applied to the English context suggest that they may not be as 
strong for the American context. 
The account presented in this Article also has implications beyond the 
immediate subject of Victorian tort law. Historical inquiries are essential 
for fully understanding novel applications of traditional legal doctrines to 
changing circumstances. Their necessity is evidenced by the revolution 
in negligence doctrine brought about by the California Supreme Court 
from 1950 to 19808 on the ground that the ancient common-law rules 
were "contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian values."9 
More trenchantly, many of the same dilemmas faced by English judges in 
the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution are being reprised for con-
temporary American jurists. The question of how or whether to apply 
long-standing doctrines developed in an earlier age to rapidly emerging 
technological innovations challenges our legal system on an almost daily 
basis. For example, recurring issues drawn from only the Anglo-
American common law of property include: what intellectual or real prop-
8. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975) (disposing of contributory negli-
gence in favour of comparative negligence); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (jettison-
ing the three traditional categories of occupiers' liability and adopting a general duty of reasonable 
care). For opposing views on whether such an overt shift in jurisprudence was warranted, compare 
Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing "Duty," 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265 (2006), with John C.P. 
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to Assumption of Risk, Attractive 
Nuisance, and Other "Quaint" Doctrines Can Improve Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. 
L. REv. 329 (2006). 
9. Rowland, 443 P.2d. at 568; id. at 567 ("Whatever may have been the historical justifications 
for the common law distinctions, it is clear that those distinctions are not justified in the light of our 
modern society."). 
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erty rights, if any, ought to extend to technological innovations,10 inforrna-
tion,11 creative works, 12 and genetic materials?;13 is trespass in cyberspace 
actionable as a trespass to chattel?;14 and is the worldwide web even a 
place?15 Understanding how a previous generation of judges approached 
similar jurisprudential quandaries, as well as what motivated their deci-
sions, lends insight to modem-day struggles with these dilemmas. Finally, as 
a collective intellectual biography of a homogeneous judiciary, the Article 
raises questions about the diversity of contemporary judges and legal insti-
tutions.16 
The Article proceeds as follows. By way of background, Part I de-
scribes pre-Victorian duties owed by employers to strangers and to their 
own servants. Part II sets forth the doctrinal defences that precluded em-
ployers' liability and demonstrates that each was a judicial creation that ne-
gated the claims of injured workmen. Expanding on this assertion, Part III 
shows how English judges annulled resourceful attempts by plaintiffs, and 
even a pair of sympathetic judges, to establish limited workplace liability. 
Finally, Part IV argues that the influence of political economy selectively 
applied through a class-based perspective is the most plausible explanation 
for why nineteenth-century judges acted in the manner described in Parts 
II-III. It reveals that the three leading rationales for the parallel devel-
opment of American tort law Uudicial restraint, the invisible hand hy-
pothesis, and the subsidy theory) provide insight into the course of the 
events depicted, but are flawed. 
I. PRE-VICTORIAN EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY 
As a prelude to discussing judicial hostility to the development of em-
ployers' liability in Parts II and III, this Part examines the extent of masters' 
pre-Victorian duties. Section A provides a brief exegesis of the independ-
ent tort of negligence, which by and large was restricted to status-based 
categories until a notable pair of cases were handed down in 1837. Next, 
10. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004). 
11. See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Informa-
tion?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007). 
12. See Madhavi Sunder, IP1, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006). 
13. See Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the 
United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Excep-
tion, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623 (2001). 
14. For a powerful (but rejected) affirmative view of this question, see Richard A. Epstein, Cy-
bertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2003). 
15. The question arises in several contexts, one of which is whether the Internet is a place of 
public accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See PETER BLANCK ET AL., 
DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY§§ 31-32 (2004). 
16. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS 
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005); see also DAVID B. WILKINS, THE BLACK BAR: THE LEGACY OF 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE OF RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROFESSION (2007); Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of 
Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (2004) (responding to Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analy· 
sis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004)). 
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Section B sets forth the scope of masters' vicarious liability to third par-
ties for injuries caused by their servants, a duty which was limited to acts 
committed by servants in the ordinary course of employment. Finally, 
Section C briefly summarises the customary terms of employment govern-
ing master/servant relations, and demonstrates that employers were not 
generally required to furnish medical attendance to their incapacitated 
workers. 
A. General Duties of Negligence 
Although liability for inadvertence can be traced back to the Year 
Books, negligence as an independent tort is an essentially Victorian phe-
nomenon. Traditionally, inadvertent injury gave rise to civil liability for the 
violation of five distinct types of duty, each of which involved an undertak-
ing that equated the individual's status with attendant care obligationsY 
Consequently, whether a farrier was imprudent or sadistic when improperly 
shoeing a horse was irrelevant; the point was that the plaintiff had taken his 
horse to the blacksmith and that it had not been shoed properly. 18 
Pre-Victorian actions clearly grounded in negligence are sparse, a fact 
that is largely attributable to the governing procedural forms of action. 
Since these prescribed the means for asserting tort claims, the number of 
cases expressly asserting negligence as the underlying cause of action was 
reduced to a small handful. 19 In addition, if defendants did manage to raise 
the issue of fault, they did so before a jury, after having first pleaded the 
"general issue" by averring simply that they were "not guilty."20 Moreover, 
whatever explanations these defendants might have offered at trial were 
not recorded.21 The result is that legal historians largely concluded that 
prior to the nineteenth century negligence was not actionable per se.Z2 A 
more accurate statement is that negligence was not actionable per se as a 
17. These duties emanated from: (1) a public calling such as an innkeeper or common carrier, (2) a 
public office (e.g., a sheriff), (3) a bailment, ( 4) a prescription or custom, and (5) the control of dangerous 
things, such as unruly animals. See Percy H. Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 
41, 44-48 (1934). 
18. The most comprehensive historical treatment of doctrinal negligence is by Professor Sir John 
Baker who notes that traces of negligence as an independent tort can be seen as far back as the fourteenth 
century. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 403 n.10 (4th ed. 2002) 
(citing fourteenth-century Plea Roll cases). 
19. Specifically, if a plaintiff was injured by an intentional harm he would sue in trespass. If the harm 
was unintentional, then assumpsit was available when the injury was caused by a prior relationship between 
the parties, for example if the defendant was a common carrier. Barring such a relationship, the plaintiff 
could sue only because of the indirect nature of the injury. See BAKER, supra note 18, at 406-{)9. 
20. /d. at 403. 
21. The procedural explanation for the scarcity of "true" negligence actions can be attributed to the 
venerable S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 283-313 (2d ed. 1981). 
22. A classic example is Winfield's understated description of pre-nineteenth-century negligence as a 
"skein of threads" yielding "little more than a bundle of frayed ends." Percy H. Winfield, The History of 
Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 LAW Q. REv. 184, 185 (1926). 
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matter of formulaic pleading, but that the remedy nonetheless existed, al-
beit in an unknown quantity, both by inference and in practice.23 
Then, because modern transportation harmed increasingly large 
numbers of legally unrelated individuals, negligence evolved from having 
been almost exclusively a method for committing recognised torts into its 
own independent tort.24 In this evolution, "the year 1837 marked a turn-
ing point,"25 with the cases of Vaughan v. Menlovfi26 and Langridge v. 
Levy.27 These judgments extended the scope of cognisable liability aris-
ing from either the five pre-industrial type duties or through contractual 
agreement by espousing a more general negligence-based duty of care.28 
Nonetheless, Baron Parke explicitly rejected the broad type of duty 
sought by the latter plaintiff on the ground that it could lead to an "in-
definite extent of liability. "29 
Parke's apprehension that clever counsel would seize upon Lan-
gridge as a precedent for attempting to expand tort liability was soon 
proven prophetic. So, too, his call for the refutation of these ventures. 
When duty-based claims were asserted on behalf of injured or deceased 
workmen, resistance by English judges, and in particular by his fellow 
Barons of the Exchequer, would prove staunch. 
B. From Masters to Third Parties 
The principle that masters could be held vicariously liable for the acts 
of their servants owes a large debt to Chief Justice Holt. In a trio of cases 
handed down at the end of the seventeenth century, Lord Holt ruled mas-
ters responsible for the negligence of their employees in spoiling goods in 
transit, failing to convey goods safely, and spreading fire. 30 Precedent ex-
isted for employers' liability in the first two instances as arising from the es-
tablished duties of carriers, but the last situation was novelY This expan-
23. See BAKER, supra note 18, at 410-11. 
24. See generally M.J. Prichard, Trespass, Case and the Rule in Williams v. Holland, 1964 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 234 (explaining that negligence actions become prominent due to running down cases, 
rather than industrial accidents). 
25. See Winfield, supra note 17, at 51. 
26. (1873) 3 Bing. 468, 173 Eng. Rep. 232. 
27. (1873) 2M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863. 
28. In Vaughan the plaintiff was awarded damages against his neighbor who he alleged had 
"wrongfully, negligently, and improperly" kept a haystack that spontaneously combusted in contra-
vention of his "duty." Vaughan, 3 Bing. at 468, 173 Eng. Rep. at 232. Acknowledging that this was a 
case of first impression, the Court of Common Pleas upheld the trial court upon the sweeping principle 
that everyone has a duty to use their land so as not to injure others. !d. Langridge involved injuries 
arising from the sale of a defective firearm under a false pretence. Langridge, 2 M. & W. at 519, 150 
Eng. Rep. at 863. Affirming the jury award, the Court of Exchequer ruled that an implied duty was 
created where none had previously existed because the defendant had falsely misrepresented the gun's 
safety. !d. at 530, 150 Eng. Rep. at 868-69. 
29. Langridge 2M. & W. at 530, 150 Eng. Rep. at 868. 
30. Respectively, Boson v. Sandford, (1691) 2 Salk. 440, 91 Eng. Rep. 382; Middleton v. Fowler, 
(1699) 1 Salk. 82, 91 Eng. Rep. 247; Tuberville v. Stamp, (1698) 1 Raym. Ld. 264, 92 Eng. Rep. 671. 
31. See generally G.F. JONES, A TREATISE OF THE LAW CONCERNING THE LIABILffiES AND RIGHTS 
OF COMMON CARRIERS 1-27 (London, Joseph Butterworth & Son 1827). 
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sion of masters' vicarious liability to strangers for their servants' harms was 
recapitulated in a trio of nisi prius cases (meaning, trials held before juries 
at local Assizes) in which Holt presided.32 
Lord Holt's innovative notion of employers' vicarious liability became 
sufficiently entrenched in mainstream legal thought by the time of William 
Blackstone for the great commentator to state with confidence that if a ser-
vant "by his negligence does any damage to a stranger, the master shall an-
swer for his neglect."33 What remained to be clarified, and often at the 
hands of Baron Parke, was defining the limits of this doctrine. Specifically, 
to hold employers responsible for their workers' actions, courts had first to 
determine if the person employed stood in the legal relationship of a ser-
vant to the defendant. These cases frequently involved construction con-
ducted under the growing use of subcontracting relationships.34 Once it was 
determined that the negligent actors stood in the position of servants to the 
named defendants, most reported decisions upheld liability by stating with-
out further elaboration the proposition that masters were responsible for 
injuries to strangers caused by their servants' negligence.35 Conversely, if 
negligent workmen were shown to exercise an independent calling, plain-
tiffs were barred from recovering vicariously against employers because 
these workmen, as nonservants, were not considered to have acted under a 
master's control.36 Nevertheless, in 1840, Baron Parke lessened the signifi-
cance of these latter rulings by holding that the violation of duty therein 
arose not from a master/servant relationship but instead from a property 
holder's duty to "take care that his property is used or managed, that other 
persons are not injured.'m 
Establishing culpability was more difficult when intricate fact situa-
tions compelled courts to parse out whether the unskilled actions of ser-
vants arose within the "ordinary course of employment," thus casting re-
sponsibility upon those servants' masters. The majority of these actions 
involved driving-related incidents alleging specific acts of carelessness, in-
cluding servants not traversing the safest route, incorrectly letting off pas-
32. See Hem v. Nichols, (1708) 1 Salk. 289, Eng. Rep. 256 (holding a merchant civilly answerable for 
the deceit of his overseas factor in the sale of silk); Jones v. Hart, (1697) 1 Raym. Ld. 738, 91 Eng. Rep. 382 
(declaring a pawnbroker accountable for his servant's loss of an entrusted item); Anon., (1701) 1 Raym. Ld. 
739, 91 Eng. Rep. 1394 (finding a master culpable for both personal and material injuries caused by the 
reckless driving of his servant). 
33. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 431 (Dublin, John Ex-
shaw et al. eds., 1769). 
34. Perhaps the best-known case of the time is Bush v. Steinman, (1799) 1 Bos. & Pul. 404, 126 Eng. 
Rep. 978, wherein Chief Justice Eyre extended liability up a distant chain of command on the ground that 
the defendant was the person "from whom the authority flows, and for whose benefit the work is carried 
on." /d. at 404, 126 Eng. Rep. at 981. 
35. See, e.g., Hem, 1 Salk. at 289, 91 Eng. Rep. at 256; Jones, 1 Raym. Ld. at 738, 91 Eng. Rep at 382; 
Anon., 1 Raym. Ld. at 739,91 Eng. Rep. at 1394. 
36. See generally ROWLAND JAY BROWNE, A PRAcnCAL TREATISE ON AcnONS AT LAW 178-79 
(London, H. Bitterworth 1843). 
37. Quarman v. Burnett, (1840) 6 M. & W. 499,151 Eng. Rep. 509,514. 
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sengers, and improperly utilising their masters' horses?8 As with the de-
termination of the chain of command between masters and servants, Baron 
Parke once more played a crucial role by introducing the criterion of a ser-
vant being "on a frolic of his own" as a counterbalance to the by-then 
common standard for liability, in the "course of employment."39 
Paralleling and influencing the development of substantive vicarious 
liability law was the sorting out of procedural niceties involved in bringing 
suit against masters for their workers' careless actions. At issue was 
whether running-down actions against a master should be initiated through 
a writ of trespass or by way of an action on the case. Traditionally, courts 
held that direct injuries required the former and indirect harm the latter.40 
This dichotomy thrust the escalating number of running-down accident vic-
tims into a procedural quandary that was not resolved until1833, when Wil-
liams v. Holland restricted trespass actions to the narrow field of wilful 
conduct resulting in immediate harm.41 In 1849, Baron Parke applied this 
procedural rule in a pair of trespass suits brought against employers for in-
advertent harms caused by their servants in the course of employment.42 
Employers were not liable for intentional or unlawful acts conducted by 
employees on their own initiative, but were responsible when either insti-
gating or ratifying such conduct, or when the actions were performed for 
their benefit, however injudiciously.43 
By the beginning of the Victorian era, it was clear that employers 
could be held vicariously liable for the inattentive acts their servants com-
mitted against third parties in the ordinary course of employment. An issue 
38. In Dudley v. Smith, (1808) 1 Camp. 107, 107 Eng. Rep. 915, 916, for instance, a stagecoach driver 
instructed his passenger to hold onto the outside of the vehicle while he pulled up closer to an inn. Passing 
under a low archway, the plaintiff struck her head and was injured. /d. 
39. Joel v. Morrison, (1834) 6 Car. & P. 502, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338, 1339. 
40. See generally MILSOM, supra note 21, at 283-313. 
41. See Williams v. Holland (1833) 10 Bing. 112, 131 Eng. Rep. 848. Briefly, because plaintiffs were 
unable to join trespass and case actions due to their conceptual differences, they bore a significant risk that 
recovery would be precluded through an unprecipitous choice of writ. Injuries resulting from the defen-
dant's driving were considered direct, necessitating a trespass action. Accidents arising from the servant's 
driving were not viewed as immediate, and thus had to be framed in case. Once one or the other form of 
action had been chosen by the plaintiff, crafty defence counsel could move for dismissal, averring after de-
murrer that it was really the unnamed master or servant who had been driving. Prichard, supra note 24, at 
241. 
42. See, e.g., Sharrod v. London & Nw. Ry. Co., (1849) 4 Ex. 580, 154 Eng. Rep 1345 (involving a 
railway company servant who ran over cattle in spite of direction to drive slowly); Gordon v. Rolt, (1849) 4 
Ex. 365, 154 Eng. Rep. 1253 (allowing a claim against a master on account of his workers' accidental break-
ing of the plaintiff's crane). 
43. Compare Bowcher v. Noidstrom, (1809) 1 Taunt. 568, 127 Eng. Rep. 954 (exculpating a mas-
ter/owner for his servants' wilful injury to another ship in the absence of an overt direction to cause harm), 
with Lewis v. Read, (1845) 13 M. & W. 834, 153 Eng. Rep. 350 (ruling a master responsible for his bailee's 
illegal distraint), and Huzzey v. Field, (1836) 1 M. & W. 506, 150 Eng. Rep. 186, 186 (holding a boat's mas-
ter responsible for his servant's wrongly receiving a ferry charge because, even absent an express command, 
he was "acting at the time in the course of his master's service and for his master's benefit"). Meagre judi-
cial treatment of this topic may be explained by a combination of two factors. First, the relatively straight-
forward nature of the vi et armis procedure for alleging direct harm caused by the servant made it clear that 
vicarious liability would not ensue. Second, barring exceptional circumstances courts thought it unseemly 
to hold masters responsible for deliberate injuries inflicted by their workers. 
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that had not yet been broached, but which would both occupy judicial at-
tention and engage considerable resistance for the remainder of the nine-
teenth century, was whether a master's vicarious liability extended to ser-
vants injuring other servants. 
C. From Masters to Their Servants 
Historically, the scope of masters' obligations to their servants was 
contractual. Whether oral, written, or implied, the terms of agreement 
were established by custom and enforced through the common law. Em-
ployment was typically for a year, commanded all available working hours, 
and was unaffected when illness or accident prevented a labourer from 
rendering her services.44 
The law was equally settled that masters were not responsible for 
furnishing medical treatment to their ailing servants unless they them-
selves solicited or acquiesced in the care provided.45 Responsibility for 
medical care traditionally fell upon parishes through the aegis of the Old 
(meaning, pre-1834) Poor Law, which "was the principal legal provision 
for the victims of serious accidents at work" until the advent of reforming 
legislation near the end of the nineteenth century.46 A servant who be-
came ill during the course of her yearly service remained in her master's 
parish and was provided with medical attention if she was otherwise eligible 
for settlement (i.e., legal residence) in that parish. When a servant fell ill or 
was injured outside her settlement, the parish where the worker had be-
come "casually" indisposed was under an obligation to provide medical 
care until she was "removed" to her own parish.47 
In theory, the New Poor Law did not change the provision of medical 
relief to the destitute.48 In reality, the amended legislation brought in its 
wake newly economical methods for relieving the impoverished.49 These 
included pooling parish medical providers, a corresponding reduction in 
44. M. DALTON, THE COUNfREY JUSTICE 85 (London, John Mori 5th ed. 1635), a popular practical 
manual for justices of the peace, stated that in the event a yearly servant "be hurt or lamed, or otherwise" 
incapable of work, "the master must not therefore put such servant away, nor abate any part of his wages 
for such time." 
45. A trio of cases formally developed these propositions: Cooper v. Phillips, (1831) 4 Car. & P. 
581,172 Eng. Rep. 834; Sellen v. Norman, (1829) 4 Car. & P. 80, 172 Eng. Rep. 616; and Wennall v. Adney, 
(1802) 3 Bas. & Pul. 248, 127 Eng. Rep. 137. 
46. A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 117 (1995). 
47. This was because simply falling ill in a parish did not confer settlement in that parish. R. v. In-
habitants of Titchfield, (1757) 2 Burr. S.C. 511, 512. Once burdened with casual patients, parishes immedi-
ately sought out orders of removal which permitted the overseers to return the healed paupers-frequently 
accompanied by bloated bills for their medical care-to their original parishes. The extent to which over-
seers went in removing paupers from their parishes was limited only by their ingenuity or ethics. In R. v. 
Seward, (1834) 1 Ad. & E. 706, 110 Eng. Rep. 1377, for instance, Isle of Ely overseers conspired to remove 
a casual indigent by marrying her off to a pauper from another parish. 
48. Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834,4 & 5 Will. IV, c. 76. 
49. P.W.J. BARTRIP, MIRROR OF MEDICINE: A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 
51-55 (1990) ("Poor Law medicine was relatively generous and effective before the 1834 amendment." 
Afterwards, it was not.). 
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the total annual expenses allocated by parishes on medical assistance, of-
fering paupers loans in lieu of medical assistance, and decreases in indi-
vidual physicians' salaries.50 Perhaps most parsimonious was the require-
ment that local Board of Guardians approve ministrations to casual 
accident victims in advance.51 Because this latter constraint precluded what 
was in essence an injured labourer's only legally recognised remedy for oc-
cupational harm, the absence of Poor Law relief in ensuing years would 
give rise to incapacitated labourers seeking redress in Her Majesty's 
courts. 52 
The manner in which counsel framed the declarations of injured 
workers, and the concerted resistance that these assertions encountered at 
the hands of English judges, is discussed next, in Parts II-III. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON EMPLOYMENT, 
1837-1880 
In a trio of decisions, the Court of Exchequer foreshadowed and then 
created the doctrine of common employment. At the same time, the Ex-
chequer acknowledged that masters might be held liable for accidents that 
they themselves brought about. Overlapping with these rulings was a series 
of House of Lords appeals from Scottish courts, which affirmed employers' 
accountability for personally bringing about harm and then firmly ce-
mented the defence of common employment onto the British legal land-
scape. Following the last of these decisions, English courts increasingly 
widened the scope of workers considered fellow servants and barred from 
recovering vicariously against common masters. Two short-lived juridical 
attempts to carve out a limited exception from common employment were 
similarly defeated. 
A. The Origins ofthe Doctrine of Common Employment, 1837-1858 
The Court of Exchequer invented the doctrine of common employ-
ment. Although the Barons offered a narrow and circumscribed exception 
to a complete disavowal of employer's liability, one that was echoed by the 
House of Lords when reviewing cases appealed from the Scottish courts, 
both the Exchequer and the Law Peers staunchly and broadly supported 
the common-law defence. 
50. It was the latter that was most bitterly resented by members of the medical profession. See, 
e.g., Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Poor Law Amendment Act, 30 
LANCET 760-63 (1838) (reporting that the President of the British Medical Association had "lost his 
situation at Dulwich because he would not belong to a medical club"); Report of the Council of the 
British Medical Association on the Present State of the Poor-Law Question, 30 LANCET 750-51 (1838) 
(objecting that "the salaries offered to medical officers were miserably insufficient to enable them to 
do justice to themselves"). 
51. See SIMPSON, supra note 46, at 124. 
52. Credit for noting this connection is due entirely to SlMPSON,supra note 46, at 127. 
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1. The Court of Exchequer 
In the year of Victoria's ascension, Priestley v. Fowler became the first 
recorded decision of a servant suing his employer for work-related inju-
ries.53 Although the case is best understood as an unsuccessful attempt to 
fashion a general duty of care on behalf of masters towards their servants, 54 
the ratio of the decision laid the groundwork for the doctrine of common 
employment that was later produced in the companion cases Hutchinson v. 
York, Newcastle & Berwick Railway Co. and Wigmore v. Jay.55 
Priestley involved the claims of Charles Priestley against his master 
Thomas Fowler for injuries sustained in a wagon accident conducting 
mutton to market.56 The van was driven by fellow employee William 
Beeton and apparently was overladen, because Beeton protested to 
Fowler "he ought to be ashamed of himself for sending such a dangerous 
load."57 The butcher responded by calling Beeton "a damned fool for 
saying anything of the sort. "58 Priestley observed the exchange, but held 
his peace.59 Some hours after this ominous start, Beeton and Priestley 
heard a cracking noise. An inspection of the wagon revealed nothing amiss 
and so they continued onward. About a mile later the van's front axle 
broke and the vehicle overturned. Beeton escaped harm, but Priestley was 
buried under a mountain of mutton, suffering serious injuries. Lying "in a 
very precarious state," Priestley was taken to an inn where he remained for 
nearly five months, attended by two surgeons. His care cost a considerable 
£50.60 
Priestley sued Fowler at the next Lincoln Summer Assizes for com-
pensation relating to his accident.61 Serjeant Edward Goulburn and Mr. 
Nathaniel Clarke represented Priestley; Serjeant John Adams and Mr. An-
53. (1837) M. & H. 305, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030; cf EDWIN HODDER, 1 THE LIFE AND WORK OF THE 
SEVENTH EARL OF SHAFfSBURY, K.G. 301,347 (1889) (detailing the results of two previous but unre-
ported actions sponsored by the philanthropic Earl of Shaftsbury). 
54. Michael Ashley Stein, Priestley v. Fowler (1837) and the Emerging Tort of Negligence, 44 
B.C. L. REv. 689 (2003). 
55. (1850) 5 Ex. 343, 155 Eng. Rep. 150; (1850) 5 Ex. 354, 155 Eng. Rep. 155. 
56. The most insightful (and humourous) account is by the irrepressible SIMPSON, supra note 46, at 
100-34. 
57. LINCONSHIRE CHRON. & GEN. ADVERTISER, Jan. 24,1837. 
58. ld. 
59. ld. 
60. SIMPSON, supra note 46, at 101; Stein, supra note 54, at 693. 
61. As a minor, the younger Priestley sued via his father, Brown Priestley. The only viable claim 
available to Charles Priestley was a suit in negligence, whether against Fowler directly or vicariously 
through a fellow employee. As a pauper casually injured in Peterborough, Priestley had no recourse 
against his presumed parish of settlement, Market Deeping. At the same time, having undertaken payment 
of his son's medical bills "voluntarily" (meaning, without either a promise of repayment from an overseer 
or prior approval of such expenses by the medical union's Board of Governors), Brown Priestley lacked 
grounds for legal redress against the Peterborough overseers. The same could be said for Charles Priestley, 
even if he paid the bill with funds borrowed from his father. Nor was redress available from Fowler 
through the established master/servant relationship, for this did not encompass a right to medical atten-
dance in the absence of an express agreement. Consequently, suing Fowler in negligence was the Priestleys 
only hope for recompense. 
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drew Amos acted on behalf of Fowler.62 Goulbum declared that Fowler 
had breached his duty "to use due and proper care" to ensure Priestley's 
safe conveyance by overloading the van.63 No allegation was made as to 
any act, omission, or duty by anyone in Fowler's employ.64 Serjeant Adams 
maintained that Fowler could not be held liable as a master because there 
was "no such case in the books,"65 and emphasised Priestley's complicity in 
continuing to travel after witnessing Beeton's protest and also hearing the 
axle crack.66 Justice Park opined "the defendant is liable" and instructed 
the jury to concur if "the accident was occasioned by the 'pigheadedness' of 
the defendant" in making "the van shamelessly overladen."67 Charles 
Priestley was awarded a sizeable £100, but Serjeant Adams obtained a rule 
to arrest judgment (i.e., vitiate the award) on the ground "that there was 
nothing in the declaration to throw any liability on the master."68 
Arguing before the Court of Exchequer, Serjeant Goulbum acknowl-
edged that the suit was "a case of the first impression" but nevertheless vi-
able because the master/servant relationship was similar to established pre-
industrial undertakings in which duty bound the parties' actions.69 Because 
Priestley was hurt while riding on a van, Serjeant Goulbum likened his po-
sition to that of "an ordinary coach passenger."70 Lord Abinger deflected 
this analogy by noting that a servant could inspect the vehicle in which he 
was to be conveyed, whereas a passenger could not.71 Goulbum cleverly 
spun the Chief Baron's rebuke by asserting that the master/servant contrac-
tual relationship was equivalent to that of a coach and passenger: the ser-
vant paid consideration with his labour, and the master was in tum duty 
bound "not to expose him to risk in performing these services. "72 Because 
the jury had found for the plaintiff, Goulbum insisted that two inferences 
had to be drawn: that "it was the master's duty to provide a proper vehicle," 
and that "the master knew the van was overloaded.'m At no point during 
the repartee did either Serjeant Goulbum or the Exchequer Barons touch 
on the likelihood of Priestley's injury originating from the oversight of a fel-
62. No evidence exists of how such expensive legal talent was retained, although Simpson surmises 
that a contingency fee may have been arranged. See SIMPSON, supra note 46, at 102. This begs the question 
of how Fowler, as a defendant unable to proceed under a contingency fee, could have afforded his counsel 
and raises the conjecture that those costs contributed to his subsequent bankruptcy. See Priestley, (1837) 
M. & H. 305, 3 Eng. Rep. 1030. 
63. Priestley, (1837) M. & H. at 305, 3 Eng. Rep. at 1031. 
64. See id. Goulbum also played to the jury's sympathy, remonstrating the unprincipled behaviour of 
the "very opulent tradesman" who had "driven this poor lad into court." LINCOLNSHIRE CHRON. AND 
GEN. ADVERTISER, supra note 59. 
65. LINCOLNSHIRE CHRON. & GEN. ADVERTISER, July 22, 1836. 
66. /d. 
67. /d. 
68. Fowler also moved for a new trial, but this part of the rule was abandoned with his bankruptcy. 
Priestley, (1837) M. & H. at 305,3 Eng. Rep. at 1033. 
69. /d. at 305, 3 Eng. Rep. at 1031. 
70. /d. at 305-D6, 3 Eng. Rep. at 1031. 
71. See id. 
72. /d. at 306, 3 Eng. Rep at 1031. 
73. /d. 
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low servant.74 In response, Serjeant Adams proclaimed that "there is noth-
ing in the declaration which shews that this was anything more than a mere 
accident; and for a mere accident which happens in a master's service, the 
master is not responsible."75 As with the arguments presented by Gaul-
bum, defence counsel never raised the prospect of avoiding liability due to 
the intervening act of a fellow servant. 
The Court of Exchequer reserved judgment, with the Chief Baron 
presenting a rambling opinion some ten months later. The only issue to be 
decided was narrow and clear: whether "the mere relation of master and 
servant" implied a general common-law duty "on the part of the master, to 
cause the servant to be safely and securely carried."76 Lacking "precedent 
for the present action," Lord Abinger agreed that they were at "liberty to 
look at the consequences of a decision the one way or the other."77 But 
"general principles" dictated that there not be legal culpability in this cir-
cumstance, for then "liability will be found to carry us to an alarming ex-
tent."78 
Even more distressing was the prospect that the case's rationale could 
be extended further, for instance, holding a master "liable to the servant, 
for the negligence of the chambermaid, in putting him into a damp bed. "79 
Because the consequences of such an extension would engender both "in-
convenience" and "absurdity," general principles of political economy pro-
vided "a sufficient argument" against liability.80 While the master/servant 
relationship properly bound the master to directly "provide for the safety of 
his servant ... to the best of his judgment, information, and belief," it could 
"never" imply a general duty "to take more care of the servant than he may 
reasonably be expected to do of hirnself."81 
Moreover, the servant was an independent actor who was "not bound 
to risk his safety in the service of his master."82 In the face of danger, he 
was free to "decline any service in which he reasonably apprehend[ed] in-
jury to himself."83 Servants, the Chief Baron emphasised, were in as good, 
if not better positions, than their masters to appreciate possible hazards.84 
He concluded with a policy argument against liability, reasoning that it 
"would be an encouragement to the servant to omit that diligence and cau-
tion which he is in duty bound to exercise on behalf of his master."85 In 
74. See T. BEVEN, PRINCIPLES OF TifE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 372 {1889) {"In any view, the legal rela-
tionship of fellow-servants as affecting their employer is not raised, since the case does not even suggest 
that the defendant had another servant than the plaintiff."). 
75. Priestley, (1837) M. & H. at 306, 3 Eng. Rep. at 1031. 
76. /d. at 307,3 Eng. Rep. at 1032. 
77. /d. 





83. /d., 3 Eng. Rep. at 1033. 
84. See id. 
85. /d. 
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other words, the Exchequer Barons clearly foresaw that permitting 
Priestley to recover against Fowler in this novel action would open the 
floodgates to vicarious liability, entitling servants injured by their peers to 
recover against their common masters. 
Thirteen years passed between the Court of Exchequer's rulings in 
Priestley and those in Hutchinson and Wigmore where the defence of 
common employment was born "naked and unashamed."86 Hutchinson 
was an action brought by a railway labourer's widow. 87 Her counsel as-
serted that Priestley was "[t)he only reported case being on point," and 
stood solely for the proposition that employers were not responsible for in-
juries that servants could prevent by using "common prudence and cau-
tion. "88 When, as here, a labourer had been killed when the carriage in 
which he was conveyed collided with another of the defendant's railroad 
cars, "why should a servant be without remedy in cases where a stranger 
may sue?"89 Defence counsel responded that, unlike a passenger, a servant 
"virtually undertakes all ordinary risks" incident to his service.90 Without 
citing any legal basis, he also proffered that "it is difficult to see why a mas-
ter should be responsible for the acts of his servants."91 Following Baron 
Parke's suggestion, the Exchequer delayed announcing their decision so 
that the related appeal in Wigmore could be determined at the same 
time.92 Wigmore involved the death of a bricklayer in a scaffolding col-
lapse.93 It was determined at trial that defendant's foreman knowingly 
erected the structure with an unsound ledger pole.94 However, Chief 
Baron Pollock agreed with defence counsel that an action could not be 
maintained on the ground that the defendant had not personally supervised 
construction.95 
86. A. BIRRELL, FOUR LECfURES ON THE LAW OF EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AT HOME AND 
ABROAD 27 (1897); see also A.H. MANCHESTER, A MODERN LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND 
WALES 1750-1950, at 288 (1980) (noting that it was Hutchinson that "really established the rule"). 
Two events require parenthetical notation. First, the Assize case, Armsworth v. South Eastern Railway 
(1848) 11 Jur. 758, involved commonly employed servants but was nonetheless permitted by Baron Parke 
to proceed. This adds to the evidence that Priestley did not originate the defence of common employment. 
See Stein, supra note 54, passim. Second, that a year before Priestley American state courts developed a 
doctrine called the "fellow servant rule." For the clearest expression of this principle, see Farwell v. Boston 
& Worcester Railroad Corp, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). 
87. The case was brought under the Fatal Accidents Act (Lord Campbell's Act), which is discussed 
in greater detail infra Part III.B. Hutchinson was brought on a special demurrer, meaning that the case 
was not tried at the Assize level, but brought directly to the Court of Exchequer. 
88. Hutchinson v. York, Newcastle & Berwick Ry. Co., (1850) 5 Ex. 343, 346-47, 155 Eng. Rep. 
150, 152. 
89. /d. 
90. /d. at 348, 155 Eng. Rep. at 153. 
91. /d. 
92. Baron Parke's suggestion appears only in the Law Journal report. See (1850) 19 L.J.Ex 296. Re-
grettably, the Wigmore Assize decision went unreported. 
93. Wigmore v. Jay, (1850) 5 Ex. 354, 155 Eng. Rep. 155. Wigmore was likewise a Fatal Accidents 
Act claim. 
94. /d. at 354-56, 155 Eng. Rep. at 156. 
95. See id. 
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After a six-month recess, Baron Alderson delivered opinion in Hut-
chinson that, although the actual ruling in Priestley was narrow, the cases 
were "undistinguishable in principle. "96 Without supporting evidence or 
case law, Baron Alderson declared that workers naturally assumed the 
risks of their employment as part of their service contracts. Accordingly, 
Lord Abinger's dictum that "a master is not in general liable to one ser-
vant for the damage resulting from the negligence of another" was laid 
down as a controlling rule of law.97 The only possible exception was 
when a master personally hired an incompetent fellow worker.98 Since 
that instance had not been proven at trial, widow Hutchinson's claim was 
denied.99 The Court of Exchequer therefore converted Priestley's dictum 
into the doctrine of common employment-a legal defence that had not 
previously existed. 
Widow Wigmore's claim, in spite of the cleverness of her counsel, met 
with much the same result as did that of Mrs. Hutchinson. Arguing for a 
new trial before the Court of Exchequer, Mr. Watson attempted to avoid 
any obstruction created by Priestley by asserting that the duty alleged in 
Priestley "was similar to that of a common carrier," and thus inapplicable 
to a case involving a bricklayer and his supervising foreman. 100 He fur-
ther maintained that his client's claim was grounded in "a duty that arises 
out of the contract of service" not to use faulty equipment, rather than in 
a master's general duty.101 Chief Baron Pollock was unswayed that his 
own reasoning when presiding at trial was incorrect, and equated Mrs. Wig-
more's claim with those principles "laid down" in Priestley and just affirmed 
in Hutchinson; namely, that although never raised (or even in existence), 
the defence of common employment limited a master's liability to hisser-
vant to instances involving his personal, rather than vicarious actions. 102 
Since the plaintiff had not proven the defendant's foreman either deficient 
in skill or improperly employed, her motion was denied. 103 
Priestley thus stood at a crossroads of liability that the Barons of the 
Exchequer took pains to block. Although the decision itself went only to 
the possibility of a master's direct liability for creating harms that servants 
could not anticipate (and thus avoid) as a routine part of their service, the 
Court of Exchequer expanded upon Lord Abinger's far-reaching dictum to 
erect common employment as a defence to vicarious employers liability in 
Hutchinson and Wigmore. 
96. Hutchinson, 5 Ex. at 349, 155 Eng. Rep. at 153. 
97. /d. at 350, 155 Eng. Rep. at 153. 
98. /d. 
99. See id. at 349-53, 155 Eng. Rep. at 153-55. 
100. Wigmore, 5 Ex. 357, 155 Eng. Rep. at 156. 
101. See id. 
102. /d. at 357-58, 155 Eng. Rep. at 156-57. 
103. See id. at 358, 155 Eng. Rep. at 157. 
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2. The House of Lords 
Following on the Exchequer decisions in Hutchinson and Wigmore, 
three cases were appealed from the Scottish Court of Session to the 
House of Lords. In Paterson v. Wallace & Co., and in Brydon v. Stewart, 
the Law Peers held masters responsible for harms they personally 
caused.H14 The consolidated cases of Bartonshill Coal v. Reid and McGuire 
exculpated masters for the neglectful actions of fellow servants by rein-
forcing the defence of common employment105 and in so doing extended 
the doctrine's reach north of the Tweed. The agreement among these 
judges is hardly coincidental. The author of the Paterson, Brydon, and 
Bartonshill Coal ( v. Reid) opinions was Lord Chancellor Cranworth who, 
as Baron Rolfe, had participated in Hutchinson. 106 Conferring in both 
Bartonshill Coal decisions was Lord Wensleydale, formerly Baron Parke, 
who had contributed to Priestley, Hutchinson, and Wigmore. 107 
What is illuminating about Paterson and Brydon are the very brief 
statements of controlling law as to master/servant liability. In Paterson, 
Lord Cranworth held that a master "is bound to take all reasonable precau-
tions for the safety" of his workers and is under a "duty" not to induce a 
servant into thinking that the conditions are safe if he "knows, or ought to 
know" otherwise.108 Injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow servant 
(under English law) or by the rashness of the deceased plaintiff (under both 
English and Scottish law) were not, however, actionable.109 The Lord 
Chancellor similarly, but briefly, held in Brydon that masters were respon-
sible for injuries that they themselves brought about. 110 
If the small window of liability for harms personally caused by masters 
in Paterson and Brydon left any doubt that the House of Lords supported 
the doctrine of common employment, Bartonshill Coal irrefutably con-
firmed the defence. On appeal from the Scottish Court of Session, Reid 
was argued over the course of three days before Lord Chancellor Cran-
worth sitting as the sole Law Peer. Ill Seeking to overturn defendant's liabil-
ity, Solicitor-General Bethell averred that Priestley, Hutchinson, and Wig-
more precluded general liability for fellow servants and dramatically 
104. Respectively, Paterson v. Wallace, (1854) 1 Macq. 748; Brydon v. Stewart, (1855) 2 Macq. 30. 
105. (1858) 3 Macq. 266, 300. 
106. Cranworth did not sit on the companion case of Wigmore since he was raised up about a 
month after Hutchinson was heard. 17 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 159-60 (Sidney Lee 
ed., MacMillan Co. 1909). 
107. Lord Wensleydale of Walton was elevated to a peerage a month after oral argument in Reid. 
15 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 106, at 226. 
108. Paterson, 1 Macq. at 751. 
109. !d. at751, 754. 
110. Brydon v. Stewart, (1855) 2 Macq. 30, 35, 38. 
111. Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, (1858) 3 Macq. 266. The importance of the case is underscored 
by the expense of retained counsel. Funded by a mining trade union, Mrs. Reid was represented by Lord 
Advocate Moncreiff and by Serjeant Byles. The Appellant-defenders were represented by Solicitor-
General Bethell, a Queen's Counsel, and a Junior. 
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misrepresented that Scots law was "the same as that of England." 112 Lord 
Advocate Moncreiff maintained on behalf of the plaintiffs (called pursuers) 
that Scottish law sustained the principle of a master's general duty of care 
towards his servants; an obligation that was recognised by the House of 
Lords in Paterson and Brydon.113 Lord Chancellor Cranworth announced 
on completion of oral argument his certainty that English law would pre-
clude liability,114 but postponed decision for two years while the related case 
of McGuire was appealed to the House of Lords on a bill of exceptionY5 
During this time Lord Cranworth conferred on both cases with Lord 
Wensleydale (formally, Baron Parke)Y6 
Delivering opinion, Lord Cranworth recapitulated the general maxim 
of respondeat superior, through which masters were held responsible for in-
juries caused by their workers to strangers, and also acknowledged that 
Paterson and Brydon held masters liable for directly causing injuries to 
their servants.117 Nevertheless, Court of Exchequer decisions made it clear 
that when a workman contracts for his services "he knows, or ought to 
know, to what risks he is exposing himself."118 These include the possibility 
"that want of care on the part of a fellow workman may be injurious or fatal 
to him."119 When injuries result, "the blame was wholly that of the ser-
vant."120 Next, Lord Cranworth resolved that since the law of England was 
"founded on principles of universal application," the law of Scotland should 
be the same.121 Reid and his feckless colleague were therefore in common 
employment, and their widows barred from recovery.122 The companion 
case of McGuire was heard and decided later that day before now-Lord 
Chancellor Chelmsford and Lords Brougham and Wensleydale, with simi-
lar results. 123 
In sum, the prospect of precluding employers' liability for injuries to 
fellow servants germinated in Priestley, the formal doctrine of common em-
ployment was raised sua sponte in Hutchinson, and, despite narrow poten-
112. /d. at 271-72. 
113. See id. at 274-76. 
114. /d. at 276--78. 
115. Batonshill Coal Co. v. McQuire, (1858) 3 Macq. 300. Arising from the same incident as Reid, 
McGuire's claim reached a £100 verdict through an agreement to abide the disposition in Reid. /d. 
116. Cranworth was now the former Lord Chancellor, following the demise of Derby's brief min-
istry. 17 DICfiONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 106, at 160. 
117. See Reid, 3 Macq. at 282-84. 
118. /d. 
119. /d. at 284. 
120. /d. 
121. /d. at 285, 289-94. Due to its clarity in applying "universal" principles of political economy, 
Lord Cranworth also took the unusual step of appending a copy of Fanve/1, supra note 86, to his opinion. 
/d. at 316. 
122. /d. 
123. Bartonshill Coal Co. v. McGuire, (1858) 3 Macq. 300, 307. Parenthetically, after concurring 
with the result, the Lord Chancellor raised in dictum the prospect of servants recovering for injuries in-
flicted by fellow servants of unequal status. Ironically, this statement in McGuire was ignored by subse-
quent plaintiffs' barristers, who attempted to establish an exception to common employment through 
Paterson and Brydon. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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tial avenues for liability when masters themselves brought about injuries, 
the defence was reaffirmed and expanded in Bartonshill Coal. As one 
commentator archly described the course of the doctrine: "Lord Abinger 
planted it, Baron Alderson watered it, and the Devil gave it increase."124 
It is to the defence's cultivation that we now turn. 
B. Expanding the Doctrine of Common Employment, 1858-1880 
Following on the Bartonshill Coal decisions, English courts progres-
sively enlarged the types of workers considered within the same service. In 
consequence, a greater variety of suits by injured co-workers were barred 
against their common masters. Three judges (one Scottish and two Eng-
lish) unsuccessfully attempted to uphold a narrow exception from the de-
fence of common employment for servants of unequal status. 
1. Widening the Scope of Fellow Service 
Subsequent to the Bartonshill Coal decisions, the extent of employ-
ers' liability for workplace injuries was contingent upon whether a negli-
gent workman was deemed a fellow servant of the plaintiff. In conse-
quence, the English judiciary extended the application of the defence of 
common employment over an increasingly broad range of workers. 125 
They achieved this augmentation by grouping together nearly all the ser-
vants of a given mutual employer, even those in dissimilar occupations.126 
Chief Justice Erie's reasoning on this matter is worth noting. Despite 
conceding that "many cases" exist wherein "the immediate object on 
which the one servant is employed is very dissimilar from that on which 
the other is employed," the risk of harm "is so much a natural conse-
quence of the employment ... that it must be included in the risks that 
are to be considered in his wages. "127 
The corollary of so encompassing a definition incorporated an as-
tonishing range of activities within the scope of common employment. 
These included: a carpenter repairing the roof of a railway station and 
labourers shifting engines on a turntable,128 a miner and a mine under-
124. COURTNEY STANHOPE KENNY, A SELECfiON OF CASES ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE ENGLISH 
LAWOFTORT90(5thed.1928). 
125. See THOMAS BEVEN, THE LAW OF THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION 378 (London, Waterlow Bros. & Layton 1898) (noting that Bartonshill Coal "was the 
starting point of a large number of decisions, the general effect of which was indefinitely to extend" the 
scope of common employment). 
126. Thus, common employment was described by Chief Baron Kelly as work "incidental to the 
carrying on of the general business" of a common master. See Warburton v. Great W. Ry. Co., (1866) 
2 L.R. Ex. 30. Similarly, Justice Brett considered two labourers to be commonly engaged when "the 
service of each will bring them so far to work in the same place and at the same time ... as part of the 
work which he is bound to do .... " Charles v. Taylor, Walker & Co., (1878) 3 C.P.D. 496. Justice 
Brett had advocated the railway's position as a Q.C. before Chief Baron Kelly in Warburton. 
127. Morgan v. Vale of Neath Ry. Co., (1865) 5 B. & S. 736, 122 Eng. Rep. 1004. 
128. See id. 
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looker/29 a licensed waterman employed to moor and unmoor barges and 
labourers at a nearby warehouse, 130 a scaffolder and the building man-
ager, 131 a ship's chief and third engineers, 132 a clerk of works and a con-
struction worker,133 and railway guards with both a gang of platelayers134 
and a labourer who loaded ballast onto wagons,135 to name only a few. 
Moreover, appellate courts frequently negated jury awards to workmen 
injured by fellow servants, further extending judicial control over the de-
velopment of the doctrine of common employment. In one appellate de-
cision, Justice Willes sternly cautioned against allowing juries to deter-
mine who were commonly employed: "There is always a strong 
inclination to find some mode of giving the plaintiff redress," he admon-
ished, but "one man's misfortune must not be compensated for at an-
other man's expense."136 
Central to these cases is the deeply held belief that, as part of their 
service contracts, labourers voluntarily assumed all the risks incident to 
their employment, including hazards brought about by fellow workers. 
This conviction, expressed as a certainty without empirical inquiry or fac-
tual support, rationalised denials of workers' claims on the ground that any 
additional compensation in the guise of damages constituted an unbar-
gained-for windfall. As articulated by Chief Baron Kelly, "it must be pre-
sumed that a servant takes upon himself the risk of any injury he may sus-
tain by the negligence of another servant," for the assumption of that "risk 
is part of the consideration for the wages which he is entitled to receive."137 
Similar explanations were offered on different occasions by other promi-
nent members of the judiciary, including Chief Baron Pollock;138 Chief Jus-
tices Erle,139 Grove/40 and Cockburn;141 and Justice Blackburn.142 The re-
129. Hall v. Johnson, (1865) 3 H. & C. 589, 590, 159 Eng. Rep. 662, 662...{)3. 
130. See Lovell v. Howell, (1876) 1 C.P.D. 161. 
131. See Gallagher v. Piper, (1864) 16 C.B. (N.S.) 677, 143 Eng. Rep. 1293. 
132. See Searle v. Lindsay, (1861) 11 C.B.(N.S.) 429, 142 Eng. Rep. 863. 
133. See Brown v. Accrington Cotton Spinning & Mfg. Co., (1865) 3 H. & C. 511, 159 Eng. Rep. 
631. 
134. See Waller v. SE Ry. Co., (1863) 2 H. & C. 102, 159 Eng. Rep. 43; see also Lovegrove v. Lon-
don, Brighton & S. Coast Ry. Co., (1864) 33 L.J.C.P. 329, 143 Eng. Rep. 1289 (construing a railway 
platelayer and a truck-pusher to be commonly employed). 
135. See Tunney v. Midland Ry. Co., (1866) 1 L.R.C.P. 291. 
136. !d. at 297. 
137. Warburton v. Great W. Ry. Co., (1866) 2 L.R.Ex. 30, 31, 143 Rev. Rep. 858, 861. 
138. See Swainson v. Ne. Ry. Co., (1878) 2 Exch. Div. 341, 343 ("The negligence of a fellow ser-
vant is taken to be one of the risks, which a servant as between himself and his masters undertakes, 
when he enters into the service."). 
139. See Tunney, 1 L.R.C.P. at 296 (noting that it was well-settled that "a servant, when he en-
gages to serve a master, undertakes, as between himself and his master, to run all the ordinary risks of 
the service"). 
140. See Turner v. Great E. Ry. Co., (1875) 33 L.T. 431, 433 ("He submits himself to the risks 
which in the service of his master the latter may reasonably impose upon him."). 
141. See Woodley v. Metropolitan Dist. Ry. Co., (1877) 3 Exch. Div. 384, 389 (rationalising that 
an employee had waived his right to redress, for when he accepted "the benefit of employment, he 
must take it subject to its disadvantages"). 
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sult was that ever-increasing categories of employees were precluded from 
recovering against their employers for work-related mishaps. 
Thus, England's judiciary seemed to have taken to heart Chief Baron 
Pollock's admonitions that the laudable defence of common employment 
not be "trenched upon" or "frittered away." 143 
2. Defeating Two Judicial Attempts at Limiting Common Employment 
Despite the clear trend toward common employment, not every Vic-
torian jurist was convinced the doctrine was monolithic or unassailable. 
Brief attempts were made in Scotland, and to a lesser degree England, to 
follow Paterson's and Brydon's limited exception for injuries caused by fel-
low servants of unequal status. 
Lord President M'Neill, who had presided over both the trial and ap-
peal of Mrs. Reid's case, took particular umbrage to the Law Peers inter-
pretation of Scots law in Bartonshill Coal and unstintingly voiced this posi-
tion while upholding plaintiffs' awards. During the first appeal that raised 
the defence of common employment, he maintained that Bartonshill Coal 
"has not decided" that servants put into positions of "superintendence, and 
authority, and control over others" should in any way be regarded as col-
laborators of the injured servant and thus bar the servant being supervised 
from recovery.144 Three years later, the Lord President once more seized 
the opportunity to vindicate his earlier rulings by declaring that Bartonshill 
Coal had been made completely "without any explanation or observation 
as to the grounds of the [Scots] judgment" wherein the servant causing in-
jury to the pursuer had stood in a superior position to him, and was thus not 
a collaborator.145 Moreover, because the House of Lords continued to dis-
regard the ratio of Session Court rulings, he averred that the House of 
Lords in turn did not bind Scottish courts.146 Consequently, for about a 
decade, labourers in Scotland recovered against their masters for the negli-
gence of collaborators of superior position. In direct contravention of the 
English practice, this liability was largely determined by juries resolving 
"the old question, who is to be considered a fellow labourer?"147 
The possibility of a limited exception from the doctrine of common 
employment for labourers of unequal status was raised in England from 
1862-1865, first in a pair of idiosyncratic obiter dicta by Justice Byles, then 
with greater caution by Chief Justice Erle. In Clarke v. Holmes, a factory 
142. Reasoning that "[a) servant who engages for the performance of services for compensation," 
contractually agrees to "the natural risks and perils incident to the performance of such services; the 
presumption of law being that compensation was adjusted accordingly, or, in other words, that those 
risks are considered in the wages." Morgan v. Vale of Neath Ry. Co., (1864) 5 B. & S. 736. 
143. Riley v. Baxendale, (1861) 6 H. & N. 445, 448, 158 Eng. Rep. 183, 184 (Exch.); Vose v. Lon-
don & Yorkshire Ry. Co., (1858) 27 L.J. Ex. 249,252, 157 Eng. Rep. 300,303 (Exch.). 
144. M'Aulay v. Brownlie, (1860) 22 D. 975,977. 
145. Somerville v. Robert Gray & Co., (1863) 1 Macph. 769, 774. 
146. /d. 
147. Darby v.John, Duncan & Co., (1861) 23 D. 529, 530. 
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worker engaged to oil dangerous machinery was injured after being falsely 
reassured by his manager that the apparatus would be repaired. 148 Both the 
Court of Exchequer and the Exchequer Chamber affirmed a victorious trial 
verdict. 149 Concurring in the latter's result, Justice Byles commented that 
common employment ought to be restricted to domestic settings, not those 
where machinery was used, musing further that workers of superior author-
ity should be excluded from the rule of common employment.150 Two years 
later, Justice Byles followed his temeritous suggestion in Clarke by strongly 
dissenting in Gallagher v. Piper against the Court of Common Pleas over-
turning a jury verdict in a case he had tried at the London Sittings.151 In-
stead, the labourer who was permanently injured by falling from a scaffold-
ing knowingly built with insufficient materials under direction of the 
defendant's foreman should have been awarded a verdict. For the fore-
man's twenty-five years of experience running the operations of the busi-
ness, he reasoned, caused him to stand "in the position of a general agent 
for the defendants."152 And that capacity, as the defendants' "acting-
master," made the defendants vicariously liable.153 Concurring in the ad-
verse verdict because he could not distinguish the case from Wigmore, 
Chief Justice Erle admitted that "[t]he only matter upon which I pause is, 
whether or not [the supervisor] was such a general manager as to make 
himself stand in the place of [the master]."154 
Soon thereafter, Chief Justice Erle delivered two opinions in which he 
implicitly raised the prospect of excluding the negligence of vice-principals 
from common employment.155 In Murphy v. Smith, the Court of Common 
Pleas reversed a Middlesex Sittings jury verdict compensating a lucifer-
match factory worker injured in an explosion caused by a fellow servant 
who also managed the works.156 Although the Court of Common Pleas' de-
cision rested on its finding that the substitute foreman had been neither 
negligent nor acting as a representative of the defendants, the Chief Justice 
implied that a dissimilar set of facts would direct a different conclusion.157 
That same year, delivering an opinion for the Exchequer Chamber in Hall 
v. Johnson, Chief Justice Erle upheld a nonsuit of a miner wounded by a 
falling stone because the negligent underlooker was the plaintiff's fellow 
employee.158 Nevertheless, the Chief Justice noted that there were times in 
148. (1861) 6 H. & N. 349,351-52, 158 Eng. Rep. 144,145. 
149. (1862) 7 H. & N. 937,949, 158 Eng. Rep. 751,756. 
150. "Why may not the master be guilty of negligence by his manager, or agent, whose employ-
ment may be so distinct from that of the injured servant, that they cannot with propriety be deemed 
fellow-servants?" /d. at 947-49, 158 Eng. Rep. at 755. 
151. (1864) 16 C.B.(N.S.) 677,695-98, 143 Eng. Rep. 1293, 1300-01. 
152. /d. 
153. /d. at 696, 143 Eng. Rep. at 1300. 
154. /d. at 689-90, 143 Eng. Rep. at 1297-98. 
155. Justice Byles was empanelled on these cases, but concurred silently. 
156. (1865) 19 C.B.(N.S.) 361,368, 144 Eng. Rep. 827,829. 
157. See id. at 366, 144 Eng. Rep. at 829. 
158. (1865) 34 LJ. Ex. 222. 
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which "a person called a fellow laborer should rather be considered to 
stand in the position of a deputy-master," and in those circumstances "it 
might be a question whether the real master was not responsible for his 
negligence."159 
Chief Justice Erie's insinuations must have irked the Barons of the 
Court of Exchequer. Later that Term, while affirming the nonsuit of a 
builder injured while falling from scaffolding warranted by the defendant's 
foreman, Baron Martin expressly responded to the plaintiff's assertion that 
he was not a fellow workman of the foreman.160 "This is an important 
case," the Baron acknowledged, because if that assertion was upheld then 
"the liability of masters for accidents happening to persons in their service 
would be very much extended"; judges ought instead to take great "care 
that the rule of law which is already wide enough is not stretched fur-
ther."161 
Any possibility for instituting an exemption from common employ-
ment for servants of different grades, whether in Scotland or in England, 
was definitively ended by the House of Lords in Wilson v. Merry & Cun-
ningham. 162 Three Law Peers delivered an opinion on an appeal brought, 
appropriately enough, from the Scottish Court of Session. Each had held 
the post of Lord Chancellor, respectively, and each had personally bol-
stered the doctrine of common employment. After reiterating the now dec-
ade-old decision in Bartonshill Coal, Lord Cairns expressed his opinion that 
the doctrine of common employment absolutely barred recovery for inju-
ries sustained by fellow servants and was not contingent upon the "techni-
cal sense" of the equality of the involved workers.163 Lord Cranworth, who 
as Lord Chancellor had given the sole opinion in Reid, concurred and noted 
that "on this subject there is no difference between the laws of England and 
Scotland."164 The third judgment was by Lord Chelmsford, the Lord Chan-
cellor who had given judgment in McGuire. Despite Scottish decisions that 
seemed to uphold an exception to common employment, Lord Chelmsford 
stated affirmatively that subsequent English cases "clearly established" the 
absence of an exemption from common employment predicated on the 
workmen being "of different classes."165 With this decision, any opportu-
nity for English judges to follow the lead set by Justice Byles and Chief Jus-
tice Erie was foreclosed. Similarly, the Scottish Court of Session fell fully 
into place with the English courts on the matter of common employment.166 
159. /d. at 224. The Chief Justice wavered further: "We wish to reserve our opinion in respect of that 
question whenever the facts of the case shall give rise to it." /d. 
160. Lynch v. Marchmont, (1865) 29 J.P.R. 375,376. 
161. /d. 
162. (1868) 1 L.R. Sc. & D. 326. 
163. /d. at 331-32. 
164. /d. at 334-35. 
165. /d. at 338. 
166. See Leddy v. Gibson, (1873) 11M. 304 (citing Wilson while dismissing a sailor's claim for per-
sonal injuries caused by his captain's negligence). The opinion was issued by Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff, 
who as the Lord Advocate had advanced Mrs. Reid's claim. 
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This Part describes how the Barons of the Exchequer established the 
doctrine of common employment, how the House of Lords wavered and 
then instantiated it, and how the scope of the defence was then expanded to 
bar additional claims from being adjudicated. Part III sets forth how Eng-
lish courts similarly chose to prevent recovery by injured workers or their 
decedents for claims that were predicated on theories of liability beyond 
the reach of the defence of common employment. 
III. QUASHING OTHER A VENUES TO EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE LIABILITY, 
1830-1880 
English judges precluded the development of employer/employee li-
ability through techniques besides the defence of common employment. 
These included limiting noneconomic damages under the Fatal Accidents 
Act, resisting assertions of duty based on House of Lords precedent, and 
raising and applying the common-law defences of assumption of the risk 
and contributory negligence. 
A. Limiting Recovery Under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846-1880 
The concerted effort of a handful of coroners to compensate workers' 
families through archaic deodand awards was sufficiently successful that in 
1846 the deodand was abolished/67 and the Fatal Accidents Act (also called 
Lord Campbell's Act) was put in its place.168 The Fatal Accidents Act 
promulgated two novel remedies. When brought in the name of an execu-
tor or administrator of the deceased for the benefit of specified relations, it 
permitted personal actions to the same extent as if the late party had sur-
vived, as well as countenancing an action for wrongfully causing another's 
death.169 The method of calculating damages was left vague: the "jury may 
give such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting 
from such death."170 In the first case brought under the statute, Baron 
Parke instructed the jury that, because it "cannot estimate the value of a 
person's life," it should "give what [it] consider[ed] a fair compensation.'@ 
This exhortation to reasonableness became an oft-repeated formula. 172 So, 
too, the notion of allocating pecuniary loss on the basis of annual wages, a 
167. Deodand awards emanated from an arcane superstition compelling the forfeiture, at a coro-
ner's inquest, of an object that "moved to the death" of a person. After 1834 (and the New Poor 
Law), deodands were aggressively used to compensate impoverished relations of industrial accident 
victims. See generally Harry Smith, From Deodand to Dependency,ll AM. J. LEG. HIST. 389 (1967). 
168. Deodands Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Viet., c. 62; Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Viet., c. 93. 
169. Previously, common-law actions died with the injured person; moreover, it was thought crude to 
place a value on their lives. See, e.g., Baker v. Bolton, (1808) 1 Camp. 493,493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033, 1033 
(allowing damages occasioned during the lifetime of the plaintiffs wife but not afterwards, for "[i]n a civil 
Court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury"). 
170. 1846, 9 & 10 Viet., c. 93. 
171. Arrnsworth v. Se. Ry., (1847) 11 Jur. 758, 760. 
172. See, e.g., Rowley v. London & Nw. Ry. Co., (1873) 8 L.R. Ex. 221; Blake v. Midland Ry. Co., 
(1852) 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35. 
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calculation that favoured wealthier claimants who, by definition, had more 
to lose.173 Procedurally, the statute also favoured wealthier plaintiffs since 
claimants had to take out letters of administration, and that was expen-
sive.174 
Unresolved under Lord Campbell's Act was whether it provided for 
solatium, an award for pain and suffering. Such compensation was avail-
able in Scotland, was included in the original bill and acknowledged during 
Parliamentary debate by the Scottish Lord Campbell, yet was absent from 
the enacted statute (which itself did not apply to Scotland).175 The absence 
of a clause regarding solatium was ambiguous and could therefore be con-
strued either way.176 As a practical matter, excluding solatium from a jury's 
otherwise broad discretion in calculating Fatal Accidents Act remedies 
could still result in considerable monetary damages for representatives of 
men of affairs killed by corporate negligence.177 By contrast, workers' fami-
lies might get £100 or less, which while equal to some years of earnings, was 
comparatively meagre. In consequence, contemporary mining inspectors 
(who had participated in deodand inquiries) wondered whether the Fatal 
Accidents Act was really an improvement over the previous system.178 
Hence, the question became whether coroner and Radical M.P. Tho-
mas Wakley was correct in decrying the general wording of the final Bill as 
"crude" and "carelessly drawn," the work of "some legal gentleman who 
was practising as an amateur";179 or was the absence of solatium the result 
of the statute having been "drawn with a degree of cunning?"180 The Bar-
ons of the Court of Exchequer must have favoured the latter explanation, 
for they took pains to exclude solatium from claims brought under the Fatal 
Accidents Act.181 The Queen's Bench followed suit, emphasising that so-
173. Compare, e.g .• Birkett v. Whitehaven Junction Ry. Co., (1859) 4 H. & N. 731, 157 Eng. Rep. 
1029 (upholding a £200 award to the widow of a draper/postman who had earned £260/year but was 
also insolvent and in poor health), with Sykes v. Ne. Ry. Co., (1875) 44 L.J.C.P. 191 (denying recovery 
to a workman father for the contracts he could have taken had his bricklayer son survived, because 
recovery was based on their relationship rather than on a contract). 
174. 1846,9 & 10 Viet., c. 93. 
175. G.J. BELL, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 877-78 (6th ed., Edinburgh, T & T Clark 
1872) (1829) (noting that standard reparation included monetary loss and solatium for injury). 
176. Lord Campbell had recently published an unflattering portrait of the bill's co-sponsor, Lord 
Lyndhurst. See 5 J. CAMPBELL, IX & X LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS passim (5th ed., London, 
John Murray 1868). The result was an amusing repartee on the subject of valuing an action for death. 
Lord Campbell stated that "(t]he Bill will help if the learned Lord Chancellor were to meet with an 
accident on the railways." Lord Lyndhurst replied: "If my noble and learned friend should unfortu-
nately fall a sacrifice, how would any jury be able to estimate the value of his hopes?" 86 PARL. DEB., 
H.L. (3d ser.) (1846) 174-75. 
177. A seminal example is Pym v. Great Northern Railway Co., in which the Exchequer Chamber 
upheld a £13,000 jury award based on the sum which the deceased would have expended on his chil-
dren's' education and "advancement" in life. (1863) 4 B.& S. 396, 406-D7, 122 Eng. Rep. 508, 512-13. 
178. See BAR TRIP & BURMAN, supra note 7, at 11~11. 
179. 87 PARL. DEB., H. C. (3d ser.) (1846) 1372-73. 
180. W.R. CORNISH & G. DEN. CLARK, LAW & SOCIETY IN ENGLAND 175~1950, at 503-D4 
(1989). 
181. Thus, in Gillard v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co., (1848) 12 L.T. 356, Chief Baron Pollock 
held that "[i]t is a pure question of pecuniary compensation, and nothing more, which is contemplated by 
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latium was the law of Scotland and not of England. 182 One suspects that 
Lord Campbell's Act had indeed been "drawn with a degree of cunning," 
for its author and namesake was also the son-in-law of Chief Baron Abin-
ger, the judge who had denied compensation to an injured worker in the 
case of first impression, Priestley .183 
B. Resisting Assertions of Duty 
The House of Lords decisions in Paterson and Brydon laid the 
groundwork for lawyers representing afflicted workers or their decedents to 
assert several novel forms of liability. These included allegations that mas-
ters were accountable for creating extraordinary risk, hiring negligent fel-
low servants, and engaging faulty systems. Nevertheless, the Lords deci-
sions were either ignored or subverted by courts, and in particular the 
Court of Exchequer. 
1. Creating Extraordinary Risk 
In a pair of cases brought under the Fatal Accidents Act, respective 
widow-plaintiffs asserted that masters were under a duty of care to protect 
workmen from extraordinary risk. By doing so, their allegations sought to 
fall within a narrow exception from common employment set forth in 
Paterson and Brydon. The Court of Exchequer nonetheless summarily re-
jected their claims. 
In Dynen v. Leach, the plaintiff alleged that her husband had been 
employed on condition "that the defendant would take due and ordinary 
care" that he "should be exposed to no extraordinary risk in the course of 
his said service."184 In contravention of this duty, a clip was substituted for 
the usual net-bag when hoisting sugar moulds, resulting in Dynen's death.185 
The Passage Court of Liverpool nonsuited this claim.186 Moving to set aside 
that motion, Dynen's counsel argued that contrary to the employment 
agreement, as well as the House of Lords's opinion in Paterson, the method 
engaged by the defendant was unsafe. 187 Chief Baron Pollock replied that 
"the deceased should not have used" the unsafe net-bag, and that in any 
case the duty of care enumerated in Paterson "was an obiter dictum." 188 Re-
fusing the plaintiff's rule, the Chief Baron also stated, "there was no general 
the Act." Pressed by plaintiffs counsel, Pollock hypothecated that if a rich man lost his only son, 
"[n]othing on earth could compensate" for that loss. /d. at 356-57. 
182. Blake v. Midland Ry. Co., (1852) 18 Q.B. 93, 96, 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 36. 
183. CORNISH & CLARK, supra note 180. 
184. (1857) 26 L.J. Ex. 221. 
185. /d. at 221. 
186. /d. 
187. /d. at 222. 
188. /d. 
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duty thrown by law upon the master to the effect stated in the declara-
tion."189 
Four years later in Riley v. Baxendale, another widow alleged that her 
husband had been employed on terms that the "defendants should take due 
and ordinary care not to expose [him] to extraordinary danger and risk," 
but that he was nonetheless struck by a railway carriage and killed.190 At 
the sittings after Michaelmas Term, Chief Baron Pollock nonsuited the 
plaintiff on the ground that the declared facts did not sustain liability.191 On 
appeal to the Court of Exchequer to set aside the nonsuit and order a new 
trial, Serjeant Chambers asserted that "there is an implied contract between 
master and servant as to the risks of the service," the breach of which cre-
ated liability.192 Denying the plaintiff's motion, the Barons of the Excheq-
uer responded forcefully to this contention. First, Baron Martin noted that 
although there had recently been other cases asserting masters' duty, "I am 
of opinion that on the hiring of a servant no such contract as this is to be 
implied," for "the liability of a master for injury to his servant in the course 
of his employment is one of a different character."193 Baron Wilde was of 
the same view, reasoning in a circular manner that a contract could only be 
implied "which arises out of some duty so generally understood that it leads 
to the implication of a contract."194 Finally, Chief Baron Pollock expressed 
his view that the doctrine of common employment "ought not to be 
trenched upon. Servants are often far better judges than their masters of 
the dangers incident to their employment. ... "195 
2. Hiring Negligent Fellow Servants 
If intrepid lawyers were inspired by the suggestions in Patterson and 
Bryson that masters might be held liable for personally hiring incompetent 
servants who harmed their peers, these hopes were soon crushed. In the 
year following Bryson, Chief Justice Jervis of the Court of Common Pleas 
emphasised the narrow scope of possible employer/employee liability by 
requiring that plaintiffs prove at trial both the ineptitude of fellow servants, 
as well as an employer's personal negligence in their hire.196 Thus, as long 
as masters either maintained proper hiring practices or acted through an 
agent, they were effectively immune from vicarious liability claims, no mat-
ter how negligent the actions of fellow workers when injuring one an-
other.197 Applying this stringent standard, claims raised in England's courts 
189. /d. 
190. (1861) 6 H. & N. 445,446, 158 Eng. Rep. 183, 183. 
191. !d. at 446, 158 Eng. Rep. at 184. 
192. !d. at 447, 158 Eng. Rep. at 184. 
193. !d. 
194. !d. 
195. !d. at 448, 158 Eng. Rep. at 184. 
196. Tarrant v. Webb, {1856) 18 C.B. 797,802, 139 Eng. Rep. 1585, 1587. 
197. See id. at 804, 139 Eng. Rep. at 1587--88. 
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that asserted the ineptitude of fellow workers met with nonsuits,198 denials 
of liability/99 and the overturning of jury awards on the grounds of insuffi-
cient evidence.200 In consequence, House of Lords intimation of potential 
employers' liability for negligent hiring became a nearly insurmountable 
goal for either wounded workers or their representatives to achieve.201 
3. Engaging Faulty Systems 
Even less tenable than allegations of negligently hiring fellow servants 
were claims for harms arising from employers engaging faulty systems of 
operation. Both the Court of Exchequer and the Exchequer Chamber ex-
pressly rejected such declarations as exceeding the province of the jury. 
The first reported case asserting a master's liability for operating an 
enterprise in an irresponsible fashion was Skipp v. Eastern Counties Rail-
way Co. 202 There, a railway labourer severely injured while attaching a lug-
gage carriage alleged that insufficient workers had been engaged to safely 
perform this task.203 At the London Sittings before Baron Martin, evidence 
was submitted both as to the adequacy of staffing and to the fact that Skipp 
had worked his job for several months without complaint.204 The plaintiff 
was nonsuited, and his case kept from the jury.205 On motion for a new trial 
to the Court of Exchequer, plaintiff's counsel asserted that the job was in-
herently dangerous due to insufficient staffing.206 Affirming the nonsuit, 
Baron Parke declared that the plaintiff's "attempt to cast upon the jury the 
duty of fixing the number of servants which a railway company ought to 
have" was inappropriate, for the defendant's foremen "are to be the judges 
of the number."207 Baron Alderson concurred, noting that "[t]he jury are 
not to be the judges of the sufficiency of any number of servants a man 
keeps."208 Finally, Baron Martin justified his removal of the case from the 
jury at the Assizes "upon the chance that their finding a verdict for the 
198. See, e.g., Searle v. Lindsay, (1861) 11 C.B. (N.S.) 429, 431-32, 142 Eng. Rep. 863, 864 (non-
suiting the claim of an engineer injured when the handles came off of a steam vessel's winch, because 
the defendants had not been negligent in hiring the engineer who had maintained it). 
199. See, e.g., Smith v. Howard, (1870) 22 L.T. (N.S.) 130, 130 (precluding recovery for a steam-
saw worker who was injured after the defendant's foreman hired an inexperienced boy to assist him). 
200. See, e.g., Allen v. New Gas Co., (1876) 1 Exch. Div. 251 (setting aside a £150 jury verdict for 
an injury caused by falling gates that the plaintiffs manager had been apprised of and ordered to fix). 
201. A narrow exception occurred when accidents involved especially young workers. For in-
stance, in Grizzle v. Frost, a sixteen-year-old girl employed for two days in a rope-making factory lost 
her arm when ordered by a foreman to place discarded hemp into rollers while the machine was in 
motion. (1863) 3 F.&F. 622, 623-24, 176 Eng. Rep. 284, 285. A jury awarded her £150 on the ground 
that the foreman, himself an inexperienced boy, should not have been managing the machinery. See 
id. at 625, 176 Eng. Rep. at 286. 
202. (1853) 9 Ex. 223, 156 Eng. Rep. 95. 
203. !d. at 223-24, 156 Eng. Rep. at 95-96. 
204. !d. at 224, 156 Eng. Rep. at 96. 
205. !d. at 224-25, 156 Eng. Rep. at 96. 
206. !d. at 225, 156 Eng. Rep. at 96. 
207. !d. at 226, 156 Eng. Rep. at 96. 
208. !d. 
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plaintiff from motives of commiseration."209 Four years later, Skipp's ra-
tionale was recapitulated by the Court of Exchequer, with Chief Baron Pol-
lock holding that "a master is not bound to use the safest method" available 
to prevent harm.210 
Jury evaluations of corporate defendants' responsibilities in conduct-
ing their operations was subjected to further reproach, first by the Court of 
Exchequer, and then the entire Exchequer Chamber, in Saxton v. Hawk-
sworth.2li In Saxton, a sheetroller was employed in a steelworks factory 
where five steam engines were used, but attended only by a single 
worker.212 After three uneventful years the plaintiff was injured when an 
unsupervised engine revolved too quickly and flew to pieces.213 Denying 
the plaintiff's motion to the Court of Exchequer for a new trial, Chief 
Baron Kelly characterised the case as raising "the question of the number 
of workmen a manufacturer may be bound to employ."214 This was an in-
appropriate inquiry because it "may be one question as between the manu-
facturer and the public, and another between himself and his servants. "215 
Affirming the Chief Baron's ruling on behalf of the Exchequer Chamber, 
Justice Willes expounded at length on the unsuitable nature of cases assert-
ing employers' liability for engaging a faulty system. This was "one of a 
great number of cases" where only after an accident occurs does the plain-
tiff discover the employer's systemic failings.216 For that reason, "cases of 
this kind ought not to be left to the jury."217 
Accordingly, courts removed the question of the adequacy of a defen-
dant's system from the province of the jury as a means of controlling mas-
ters' liability. 
C. Additional Common-Law Defences 
The common-law defences of volenti non fit injuria (also referred to as 
assumption of risk) and contributory negligence effectively barred the 
claims of injured workers seeking redress outside the boundaries already 
delineated by the fellow servant rule.218 This was especially true of volenti, 
which judges advanced in a conscious effort to nullify recovery by injured 
workmen against their employers. 
209. /d. 
210. Dynen v. Leach, (1857) 26 L.J. Ex. 221, 222. 
211. (1872) 26 L.T. 851. 
212. /d. at 851. 
213. /d. at851-52. 
214. /d. at 852 n.(a). 
215. /d. 
216. /d. at 853. 
217. /d. 
218. Together with the doctrine of common employment, these defences formed the troika "the 
ugly sisters of the common law." MANCHESTER, supra note 86, at 28~7. 
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1. Volenti Non Fit Injuria 
At the heart of the maxim volenti non fit injuria (loosely translated, "a 
willing person cannot be wrongfully harmed") was the notion that in ex-
change for their wages, workers agreed to incur the hazards of their em-
ployment. Application of volenti was a legal matter decided by judges 
based on how foreseeable the dangers of employment were at the time of 
hiring, and the degree to which workers were heedless of those dangers. 219 
The modem day question of whether they acted out of desperation rather 
than volition was not addressed.220 Valenti proved to be an effective bar to 
intrepid assertions of employers' negligence. As was the case with the par-
allel context of common employment, it was also once more the Court of 
Exchequer and the Exchequer Chamber-rather than those defending 
suits- that inaugurated the doctrine to the field of master/servant relations. 
Skipp, the initial case in which a worker declared an employer negli-
gent for engaging a faulty system, was also the first instance in which volenti 
served as a defence against the claims of a servant.221 While moving the 
Court of Exchequer for a new trial, plaintiff's counsel was interrupted by 
Baron Platt's comment that the suit came "within the maxim volenti non fit 
injuria.'m2 Baron Parke then interjected that if Skipp "felt that he was in 
danger, by reason of the want of a sufficient number of fellow servants, he 
should not have accepted the service," and that by remaining he had will-
ingly incurred any subsequent danger.223 Similar reasoning manifested in 
the opinion, with Baron Martin concurring that he had "acted upon that 
principle [of volenti] at the trial," wherein he considered Skipp "a voluntary 
agent."224 These proclamations must have come as an unpleasant surprise, 
since defence counsel had not raised the prospect of volenti either at trial or 
on appeal. 
In Dynen, another faulty operations case, the Court of Exchequer 
once more raised and used the defence of assumption of the risk on its own 
initiative.225 During oral argument, Chief Baron Pollock remarked that 
"the deceased should not have used" inadequate kit, but rather "he should 
have left."226 This perspective was echoed in the Chief Baron's holding, 
which concluded that Dynen had assumed responsibility for causing his 
own death.227 Baron Bramwell explicated the brief opinion by reasoning 
that this was a situation where "the workmen has known all the facts and is 
219. See generally Terence Ingman, A History of the Defense ofVolenti Non Fit Injuria, 26 JURID. 
REV. 1 (1981). 
220. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory 
of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1987). 
221. Skipp v. E. Gun ties Ry. Co., (1853) 9 Ex. 223, 156 Eng. Rep. 95. 
222. /d. at 225, 156 Eng. Rep. at 96. 
223. /d. 
224. /d. 
225. Dynam v. Leach, (1857) 26 L.J. Ex. 221. 
226. /d. at 222. 
227. !d. at 223. 
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as well acquainted as the master with the nature of the machinery and vol-
untarily use[d] it."228 Once more, although not raised by defence counsel, 
volenti was used by the Barons to prevent recovery against an employer. 
The Court of Exchequer's belief that servants assumed all known risks 
of their employment was confirmed by the Exchequer Chamber in a third 
defective system case, Saxton. 229 Denying the plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial on other grounds at the Court of Exchequer, Chief Baron Kelly ex-
pressed his incredulity: "[C]an we believe a Sheffield man to be ignorant of 
the risks he ran" in steel manufacture?230 Affirming the Court of Excheq-
uer on behalf of the Exchequer Chamber, Justice Willes sarcastically char-
acterised the case as one "where a servant chooses to enter into an em-
ployment of which the system is well known," and only after meeting with 
an injury "suddenly finds out that the master was exceedingly wrong" in or-
ganising the workplace.231 Once more, volenti had been raised and applied 
by an appellate court without being asserted by defendants' lawyers at trial 
or on appeal. 
2. Contributory Negligence 
Contributory negligence was a factual question that was determined 
by juries.232 When raised as a defence, the issue of a plaintiff's contributory 
negligence generally hinged on his actions after a newly dangerous condi-
tion came to light.233 Timing was fundamental; if a plaintiff acted either in a 
negligent manner or had a "last clear chance" to avoid harm, his suit would 
usually fait.234 When both employer and employee knew of a hazard, and 
the latter continued to work, contributory negligence summarily barred re-
covery on the theory that the servant had brought about his own plight.235 
Consequently, the defence proved an additional barrier for workers to 
surmount in pressing accident claims against their employers. Contribu-
tory negligence was much less used than volenti because judges could 
228. !d. 
229. Saxton v. Hawksworth, (1872) 26 L.T. 851. 
230. !d. at 853. 
231. !d. 
232. See Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809) 11 East. 60, 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926,927 (directing the jury 
to determine whether plaintiff acted without ordinary care). 
233. See, e.g., id. at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927 ("Two things must concur to support [a claim for con-
tributory negligence], an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary 
care to avoid it in the part of the plaintiff."). 
234. The modern rule of contributory negligence was established in Butterfield v. Forrester, 
wherein Chief Justice Ellenborough held that to support a negligence action a "party is not to cast 
himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault of another, and avail himself of it." !d. 
235. Typical denials of liability include Dakin v. Brown, (1849) 8 C.B. 92, 137 Eng. Rep. 443 (en-
gineer killed by an exploding coffee roaster); Assop v. Yates, (1858) 2 H. & N. 768, 176 Eng. Rep. 317 
(labourer on whom building equipment collapsed); Smith v. Dowell, (1862) 3 F. & F. 238, 157 Eng. Rep. 
107 (shipwright buried under two coal bulkheads); Senior v. Ward, (1859) I El. & El. 385, 120 Eng. Rep. 
954 (coal miner who plunged to his death after refusing to examine a pit rope); Doe/ v. Sheppard, (1856) 5 
El. & Bl. 856, 119 Eng. Rep. 700; Caswell v. Worth, (1856) 5 El. & Bl. 849, 119 Eng. Rep. 697 (factory 
workers who ignored warnings not to approach unfenced machinery). 
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summarily dispose of the latter on legal grounds rather than wait on jury 
consideration. Nevertheless, application of the defence allowed judges 
to vent their animosity towards generous, and hence irresponsible, juries. 
Perhaps most notable is the severe language directed against juries 
in a pair of 1889 decisions. While reversing a verdict on behalf of a rag 
merchant's helper who had tumbled down a ladder on the ground that 
the damage had been caused by her wearing high heeled boots, Baron 
Huddleston declaimed that "[t]he verdict was obviously one of sympathy 
rather than justice."236 Justice Wiles added that juries needed to be 
firmer, else their verdicts would create mischief by encouraging "persons 
to bring actions against their employers."237 Comparable concerns were 
raised while reversing a £167 verdict for the widow of a dockworker who 
died on the first day on the job by plunging from planks set across a cais-
son chamber. Giving opinion for the court, Chief Justice Coleridge rea-
soned "if the workman chose to take a certain way when another was open 
to him, he took it at his own risk."238 Moreover, "if such verdicts as this 
were to stand," then "[a]nything happening to the workman would be 
sufficient to support a verdict against the employer. It was extremely 
important that the Courts should hold a strong hand over juries in this 
class of cases. "239 
IV. UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL RESISTANCE TO EMPLOYERS' 
LIABILITY 
Parts 1-111 demonstrated that nineteenth-century English common 
law rarely held employers accountable to their servants for harm caused by 
other workers. When faced with employer/employee tort claims these 
judges, and in particular the Barons of the Exchequer, almost uniformly re-
fused to augment employers' established vicarious liability to strangers to 
include claims by injured servants. The preceding Parts also showed that 
the judiciary precluded master/servant liability by raising and applying the 
doctrine of common employment, denying intrepid claims of duty, subvert-
ing jury awards, avoiding House of Lords precedent, and sua sponte apply-
ing the traditional (but unraised) defences of volenti non fit injuria and con-
tributory negligence. 
Part IV argues that the most comprehensive reason for understanding 
why nineteenth-century judges thwarted the growth of employers' liability 
was their selective application of political economy. It also analyses judicial 
restraint, the invisible hand hypothesis, and the subsidy theory as alterna-
tive explanations for why the claims of injured workmen and their repre-
236. Ayres v. Bull, (1889) 5 T.L.R. 202,202. 
237. Id. 
238. Pritchard v. Lang, (1889) 5 T.L.R. 639, 640. 
239. /d.; see also Kay v. Briggs, (1889) 5 T.L.R. 233, 234 (Chief Justice Coleridge stating that "here-
gretted that the evidence of contributory negligence had not been submitted to the jury, as there was ample 
evidence of it"). 
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sentatives were turned aside. Each traditional explanation lends insight to 
the phenomenon described, but none adequately explains the course of 
events. The revealed history provides a comparative perspective that in-
forms our thinking about the development of negligence doctrine in 
America and challenges a reinterpretation of existing theories, for the 
considerable weaknesses of the received historical explanations for the 
development of tort law when applied to the English context suggest that 
they may not be as strong for the American context. 
A. Political Economy, Selectively Applied 
Victorian judges resisted the development of employer/employee 
tort liability due to the influence of selectively applied notions of political 
economy. Section A.l describes the intellectual schema of political econ-
omy and its pervasive influence on the nineteenth-century worldview, 
while section A.2 demonstrates its selective application. 
1. Political Economy 
The term political economy references the classic economic theories 
set out by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations and subsequently de-
veloped by his intellectual progeny.24° Central to this schema is the 
premise that, when left alone (laissez-faire), natural principles ensure 
that markets for goods and services, including labour, operate efficiently. 
Markets capably determine prices, free bargaining is the norm, and 
knowledge is completely and symmetrically disseminated, resulting in 
prices that correlate to production value.241 In the specific context of 
agreements governing labour arrangements, it was believed that the par-
ties to a contract of service knew best the value of the benefits over 
which they bargained.242 Hence, reflected in the wages agreed upon be-
tween masters and servants was both an appreciation and an assumption 
of the risks incident to employment.243 To be fair, there is some traction 
to this assumption. One can argue that a key qualification for factory 
240. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(Dublin, 1776). See generally G.R. SEARLE, MORALITY AND THE MARKET IN VICfORIAN BRITAIN 
(1998); DONALD WINCH, RICHES AND POVERTY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY IN BRITAIN, 1750-1834 (Quentin Skinner ed., 1996). 
241. For contemporaneous assertions, see WILLIAM ATKINSON, PRINCIPLES OF PoLmCAL 
ECONOMY (New York, Greely & McElrath 1843); GEORGE HENRY SMITH, OUTLINES OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 34 (London, Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer 1866) (labourers receive maximum wages 
based on their skill and ability in relation to supply). 
242. "The produce of labour constitutes the natural recompense or wages of labour." SMITH, supra, 
note 240, at 94. See generally ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE 
EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA IN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870 (Thomas A. 
Greened., 1991). 
243. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 526 (4th ed.1971) summarises the 
assumptions as being those of "complete mobility of labor, that the supply of work was unlimited, and 
that the workman was an entirely free agent, under no compulsion to enter into the employment." 
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workers was knowing how to avoid industrial hazards and remain in one 
piece. Yet no evidence supports the widespread supposition that occupa-
tional perils were proportionately accounted for in wages, even if the as-
sumption was treated as self-evident by judges. 
The seminal work of P.S. Atiyah documents the extent to which 
nineteenth-century lawyers and judges were raised and educated on no-
tions of classic economics. In his view, the influence was so great "it is 
scarcely possible that any educated man growing to maturity" during the 
Victorian era "would not have read a good deal of the new political 
economy" and been strongly influenced by its precepts.244 This is equally 
true for notables such as Henry Brougham, judge and later Chancellor, 
who founded the Edinburgh Review (a journal on political economy) and 
ushered into Parliament David Ricardo (Adam Smith's protege), as it 
was for individuals with less publicly shared views sitting the judicial 
bench.245 
According to a public lecture delivered by the inaugural Whately 
Professor of Political Economy at Queen's College, Galway, "there are 
few persons of decent education and ordinary mental activities who do 
not form and express opinions" based on its premises.246 A review of 
contemporary publicly circulated writing bears out this conclusion. For 
example, in analysing optimal wage levels, one treatise on political econ-
omy concluded that "the lowest wage that will be accepted is determined 
solely by the worker's power to endure; he who can work with the least 
food and rest and the poorest lodging will obtain the employment. "247 As 
to the remaining population, the author believed them most suited to the 
"workhouses and refuges and charity organisations" operated for their 
"especial benefit."248 The prevalence of these views is not surprising 
244. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 293 (1979). The thrust of 
Atiyah's book is that between the years 1770 and 1870, political economy pervaded judicial views of 
contract law. 
245. See id. at 370-72; see also MARK CURTHOYS, GOVERNMENTS, LABOUR, AND THE LAW IN 
MID-VICTORIAN BRITAIN: THE TRADE UNION LEGISLATION OF THE 1870s 7 (2004) ("[T]he outlook 
of mid-Victorian judges tended to be coloured by the individualist, utilitarian assumptions" as well as 
"dogmatic individualism."). 
246. JOHN E. CAIRNES, POLITICAL ECONOMY AS A BRANCH OF GENERAL EDUCATION 6 (Lon-
don, J.W. Parker & Son 1860). Galway was not unique in accrediting political economy as a discipline. 
For instance, Oxford had a Drummond Chair in Political Economy. One might also consider its popu-
larity among not-as-well educated people who read SAMUEL SMILES, THRIFT (1875) and SAMUEL 
SMILES, SELF-HELP (1875), as well as the journal Illustrations of Political Economy with its moral sto-
ries for children by Harriet Martineau. See generally Scott Gordon, The London Economist and the 
High Tide of Laissez Faire, 63 J. PoL. EcoN. 461 (1955). 
247. ALEXANDER W. JOHNSTON, STRIKES, LABOUR QUESTIONS, AND OTHER ECONOMIC 
DIFFICULTIES: A SHORT TREATISE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 98 (London, Bliss, Sands & Foster 1895). 
248. !d. at 99; see also JOHN LANCELOT SHADWELL, POLffiCAL ECONOMY FOR THE PEOPLE 56-
57 (London, Trubner Co. 1880) (Iron puddlers must earn high wages as "a compensation for the suf-
fering and fatigue which is involved in constant exposure to the intense heat of the furnace," for oth-
erwise no one would do the work.); G. POULETT SCROPE, PRINCIPLES OF POLffiCAL ECONOMY 52 
(London, Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green, Longman, Patemaster-Row 1833) (Labour is "volun-
tary and free in the choice of its direction" such that wages are based on principles of free exchange in 
which the more skilled are paid more.). 
No.3] VICTORIAN TORT LIABILITY 967 
given that John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy had become 
"the standard text for students. "249 
Lord Abinger's opinions and public statements provide a clear ex-
ample of how political economy influenced the views of the judiciary. 
One of the most obvious exemplars is the discussion in Priestley on the 
relative rights of masters and servants. The master, the Chief Baron 
opined, had no obligation "to take more care of the servant than he may 
reasonably be expected to do of himself."250 To rule otherwise was to in-
vite "absurdity."251 Avoidance of the "absurd" as justification for corral-
ing responsibility was revived five years later in Lord Abinger's Winter-
bottom v. Wright opinion limiting liability for faulty goods.252 Lack of 
privity precluded recovery by an injured coachman against the supplier 
of a defective mail coach because if the plaintiff were allowed to recover 
"the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no 
limit, would ensue. "253 
The strong influence of political economy upon Lord Abinger may 
also be seen in House of Commons speeches delivered by him as M.P. Sir 
James Scarlett. Although his career was brief and far from stellar, it was 
notable for his rigourous efforts to amend the Old Poor Law.254 In 1821, 
Sir James put forward a bill that proposed caps on relief awards, restric-
tions on assistance to the able-bodied, and complete abolishment of the 
law of settlement.255 The rationales offered in support of this proposed 
legislation smack of classic Liberal thought. Sir James argued that the 
"great evil in connexion with the present poor laws" was "that by law an 
unlimited provision was made for the poor."256 It therefore "must oper-
ate as a premium for poverty, indolence, licentiousness, and immoral-
ity .... and nothing could be more injurious to a country" than a system 
that disincented industriousness.257 
Perhaps the most stalwart judicial proponent of political economy, 
at least as measured by publicly stated positions on the operation of la-
bour markets, was Baron Bramwell.258 His views, although relatively 
249. GORDON BIGELOW, FICfiON, FAMINE, AND THE RISE OF ECONOMICS IN VICfORIAN 
BRITAIN AND IRELAND 65 (2003). 
250. Priestley v. Fowler, (1837) M. & H. 305, 307, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1050. 
251. /d.; see a/so R.W. KOSTAL, LAW AND ENGLISH RAILWAY CAPITALISM 1825-1875, at 264 (1994) 
("The outcome of this reasoning was determined by Lord Abinger's philosophical convictions about 
the nature of personal responsibility in early nineteenth-century England."). 
252. (1842) 10M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402. 
253. Jd. at 110, 152 Eng. Rep. at 402; see also ATIYAH supra note 244, at 368 (Lord Abinger's 
Court of Exchequer was "most favourably inclined to the stern severity of caveat emptor" as an example of 
its Liberal views.). 
254. See EDWARD FOSS, A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND 1066-1870, at 
591 (London, Spottiswoode 1870). 
255. See 5 PARL. DEB., H. C. (N.S.) (1821) 573-82, 587-88, 987-99, 1228-30, 1479-83; 7 PARL. DEB., 
H. C. (N.S.) (1822) 761. 
256. 5 PARL. DEB., H.C. (N.S.) (1821) 574. 
257. ld. 
258. Richard A. Epstein, For a Bramwell Revival, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 246, 246-47 (1994), 
lauds the Baron's career-long constancy to notions of political economy. So does his biographer, not-
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stronger than those of his colleagues towards the end of the century as 
political economy began to lose influence,259 were nonetheless emblem-
atic of the perspective commonly held by the judiciary.260 In a lecture 
given to and published by the Liberty and Property Defence League (of 
which he was a founding member and life-long supporter) Lord Bram-
well exegesised the beliefs underlying political economy: people ought to 
take care of themselves "not from any arrogant notion," but rather be-
cause it is "a special knowledge" that each of us possess.261 Accordingly, 
when a worker contracted out his service it was an act of free will, with 
eyes wide open to the dangers he had agreed to encounter.262 A contract, 
the Baron averred, could never be "forced" upon anyone: "[The] advan-
tages the workman is to have in wages" come about through an open 
market wherein the master "must" pay wages commensurate to the risks 
encountered. 263 
This atomistic, existential view of the marketplace for services, and 
in particular the role played by individual labourers in mediating their 
positions, was maintained throughout the Victorian period by judges and 
jurists alike. To provide just one example, in 1887 Frederick Pollock 
(namesake grandson of the Chief Baron and the author of the first torts 
treatise ),264 stated as axiomatic that servants "contracted with the risk be-
fore his eyes, and that the dangers of the service, taken all around, were 
considered in fixing the rate of payment."265 
2. Selective Application 
Application of the postulates of political economy to new circum-
stances was selective. When faced with the equal possibility of extending 
or restricting liability, English judges favoured individuals whose social 
ing how the Baron adhered to his values with "the superior bull-terrier expression of the true English 
schoolboy." CHARLES FAIRFIELD, SOME ACCOUNT OF GEORGE WILLIAM WILSHERE, BARON 
BRAMWELL OF HEYER AND HIS OPINIONS 7 (London, MacMillan 1898). 
259. On being told during a debate that political economy was falling out of favour, the Baron 
sarcastically expostulated: "Oh dear! Oh dear! The gods I have worshipped from my youth are all 
false gods." GEORGE WILLIAM WILSHER (BARON) BRAMWELL, LAISSEZ FAIRE 5 (London, Liberty 
& Property Defence League 1884). 
260. See generally David Abraham, Liberty and Property: Lord Bramwell and the Political Econ-
omy of Liberal Jurisprudence, Individualism, Freedom and Utility, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 288,309-10 
(1994) ("[P]erhaps singular about the hegemonic impulse of nineteenth century British liberalism was 
its insistence on the universality of contract and Jaws of political economy."). Perhaps the most promi-
nent exception was Justice Byles, who early in his career anonymously repudiated some tenants of political 
economy. JOHN BARNARD BYLES, SOPHISMS OF FREE TRADE AND POPULAR POLITICAL ECONOMY 
EXAMINED (London, Seeleys 1849). As a judge he twice attempted to carve out a limited superior ser-
vant exception to common employment. See supra, Part II.B.2. Even so, it cannot be said that as a judge 
his rulings varied much from that of his peers. 
261. BRAMWELL, supra note 259, at 3. 
262. !d. at 13. 
263. !d. at 19-20. For similar assertions, see BRAMWELL, supra note 4. 
264. See generally NEIL DUXBURY, FREDERICK POLLOCK AND THE ENGLISH JURISTIC 
TRADITION (2004). 
265. FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 85 (London, Stevens & Sons 1887). 
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condition was akin to theirs, such as railway passengers, and precluded 
liability for others, most notably, labourers. The point here is not that of 
Marxist or Socialist historians who portray courts as exploiting the work-
ing classes in favour of capitalist interests, all the while justifying their ac-
tions through classical economic precepts.266 Nor is this assertion of a 
piece with outraged commentators who view the burden cast upon la-
bourers as "cruel and wicked," although on many levels it was indeed 
harsh.267 Rather, the argument is that judges did not empathise with 
workmen and were unable or unwilling to place themselves mentally or 
juridically in similar straights. They saw the world through their own so-
cial lenses, believing that everyone logically would conduct themselves in 
the same way, and did not want to alter the status quo of this admirable 
situation.268 
Accordingly, those very few successful assertions of culpability based 
on master/servant duty of care arose from injuries caused by employers 
who acted in an irrational or indecent manner with which the judges sim-
ply could not identify. These included masters who personally provided 
equipment known to be defective,269 induced labourers to return to work 
with false assurances that known defects would be repaired,270 or failed to 
protect especially young workers.271 
The notion that applying objectively correct propositions of political 
economy would have a disparate negative impact on individuals less for-
tunately placed than themselves either did not occur to judges or was re-
pressed.272 Take, as example, Lord Abinger's confident statement in 
266. See, e.g., E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1965); ARNOLD 
TOYNBEE, LECfURES ON THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (London, Rivingtons 1884); SIDNEY & 
BEATRICE WEBB, THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM (London, Longmans, Green & Co. 1884). 
267. See, e.g., 1 THOMAS G. SHERMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
NEGLIGENCE vi-vii (5th ed. 1903) ("A small number of able judges, devoted, from varying motives, to the 
supposed interests of the wealthy classes, and caring little for any others" invented common employment.); 
Seymour D. Thompson, Under What Circumstances A Servant Accepts the Risk of His Employment, 31 
AM. L. REV. 82, 85 (1897) ("(T)he rule of judge-made law which holds the servant at all times and un· 
der all circumstances" responsible for injuries incurred on the job "is destitute of any semblance of 
justice or humanity."). 
268. A similar assertion is raised in the context of labour union development by Michael J. Klarman, 
The Judge Versus the Unions: The Development of British Labor Law, 1867-1913,75 VA. L. REV. 1487, 
1559-91 (1989). 
269. See, e.g., Davies v. England, (1864) 33 L.J.Q.B. 321 (labourer hired to cut cattle carcasses who 
became ill after coming into contact with diseased meat knowingly supplied by his employers); Webb v. 
Rennie, (1865) 4 F. & F. 608, 176 Eng. Rep. 713 (holding a master liable for a rotted scaffolding's col-
lapse because he cavalierly neglected his duty to use reasonable care to inspect tackle). 
270. For example, in Clarke v. Holmes, (1861) 6 H. & N. 349, (1862) 7 H. & N. 937, a labourer's 
£200 jury verdict for grievous injuries occurring after his master promised to refence dangerous ma-
chinery was upheld by both the Court of Exchequer and the Exchequer Chamber. 
271. In Grizzle v. Frost, (1863) 3 F. & F. 622, a sixteen year old girl employed for two days in a 
rope-making factory lost her arm when ordered by a foreman to place discarded hemp into rollers 
while the machine was in motion. (1863) 3 F.&F. 622, 623-24, 176 Eng. Rep. 284, 285. A jury awarded 
her £150 on the ground that the foreman, himself an inexperienced boy, should not have been manag-
ing the machinery. See id. at 625, 176 Eng. Rep. at 286. 
272. As noted by Abraham, supra note 260, at 309, "it is characteristic of ruling classes that they 
identify their own interests as the general interest." 
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Priestley that a servant was "not bound to risk his safety in the service of 
his master," and so was free to "decline any service in which he reasona-
bly apprehends injury to himself."273 This proposition was utilised 
throughout the period by judges to justify denial of master/servant liabil-
ity.274 
Baron Bramwell also presented this position extrajudicially to a Par-
liamentary committee investigating employers' liability. On the subject of 
workers who continued to work in the face of hazardous conditions, Lord 
Bramwell challenged the notion that servants could not simply leave 
their jobs. "To my mind," he averred, "it is a sad thing to hear men come 
into court" and explain their continued employment "on the ground that 
their bread depended upon it, or something of that sort."275 Putting to 
the side the fact that the majority of industrial labourers lived at subsis-
tence levels and might indeed be placed in dire straits by walking off the 
job, or that a servant who left his post without tendering adequate notice 
was unlikely to receive the positive character reference needed for fur-
ther employment, Baron Bramwell's representation is questionable. 
Technically, a servant had to exhibit moral misconduct, willful disobedi-
ence, or habitual neglect to warrant losing his position or pay.276 How-
ever, as noted by legal commentators of the period, in practice there was 
no difference between refusing to work and willfully neglecting to do a 
job.277 Thus, servants who refused to obey their masters' orders could be 
summarily dismissed, with their remaining wages left unpaidY8 Further, 
Justices of the Peace with some frequency imprisoned less fortunate ser-
vants at local Quarter Sessions for breach of their labour contracts under 
the Master and Servants Acts.279 
It is similarly telling that, although the majority of English workers 
by the beginning of Victoria's reign were engaged in industrial pursuits,280 
all the labourers mentioned in Lord Abinger's parade of horribles in 
Priestley were domestic servants. As a wealthy individual who employed 
many of the archetypes listed, the Chief Baron was understandably taken 
273. Priestley v. Fowler, (1837) M. & H., 305, 308, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032, 1034. 
274. See supra Parts II.B.1, III. C-D, passim. 
275. 285 PARL. PAPERS 63 (1877) (Report from the Select Committee on Employers' Liability for 
Injuries to their Servants). 
276. See, e.g., Calto v. Brounker, (1831) 4 Car. & P. 518. 
277. See, e.g., EDWARD SPIKE, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT, IN REGARD TO DOMESTIC 
SERVANTS AND CLERKS, 14 (1839); HENRY FREDERICK GIBBONS, A HANDY BOOK OF THE LAW OF 
MASTERS AND SERVANTS 16 (1867). 
278. See, e.g., Spain v. Arnott, (1817) 2 Stark 256, 257-58, 171 Eng. Rep. 638, 639. 
279. See Douglas Hay, England, 1562-1875: The Law and Its Uses, in MASTERS, SERVANTS, AND 
MAGISTRATES IN BRITAIN AND THE EMPIRE, 1562-1955, at 59 (Douglas Hay & Paul Craven eds., 
2004) (empirical analysis indicating that "the law as it was applied became more identified with the 
interests of employers," including the increased incidence and severity of imprisonment for breach of 
employment contracts); Douglas Hay, Master and Servant in England, in PRIVATE LAW AND SOCIAL 
INEQUALITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 97 (Witlibald Steinmetz ed., 2000) (criminal penalties contained 
in the Master and Servant Acts made it implausible that servants could simply walk off the job). 
280. See BRIAN INGLIS, POVERTY AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLtmON 33-37 (1971). 
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aback at the prospect of a flood of employer's liability from people who 
lived under his patronage, even under his own roof.281 As explained by 
Richard Epstein-an ardent, contemporary believer in political economy-
at a time when society was rife with illness, disease, and early mortality, 
"[w]hy should the legal system intervene on behalf of those fortunate 
enough to gain employment when there were countless others, far worse 
off, who would gladly trade places with them?"282 
When Lord Abinger encountered industrial labourers in 1839, they 
had the misfortune of being Chartists demonstrating for a universal fran-
chise; worse, he was to judge their criminal prosecution for illegal organ-
ising.283 Charging the jury, the Chief Baron remonstrated against collec-
tive action as the bane of individual freedom and responsibility. A 
publication the defendants had distributed in favour of Parliamentary 
representation, he further averred, was likely "to excite the poor against 
the rich," lead to "violence and bloodshed," and ultimately encourage 
the destitute to "do nothing less than to pull down the monarchy, to de-
stroy the aristocracy."284 The arraignment was considered sufficiently 
provocative that Sir Frederick Pollock, hardly a champion of labourers,285 
moved the Commons to charge Lord Abinger with judicial misconduct.286 
Nonetheless, other judges repeated both the antipathy that Lord 
Abinger displayed towards labourers seeking social progress, and the jus-
tifications of political economy that bolstered that feeling. When sen-
tencing sixteen defendants in a tailors' strike, Baron Bramwell stated 
that "reason and justice" were against the cause of unionism, for "every-
body knows that the total aggregate happiness of mankind is increased 
by every man being left to the unbiased, unfettered determination of his 
281. Most nonindustrial servants were referred to as "menial'' from the Latin description of those 
workers "being intra moenia," i.e., living "within the house or walls of their master." JAMES BARRY BIRD, 
LAWS RESPECONG MASTERS AND SERVANTS, ARTICLED CLERKS, APPRENTICES, AND JOURNEYMEN AND 
MANUFACfURERS 1 (London, W. Oark & Son 1795). 
282. Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation 
Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775,777-78 (1982); see also DAVID GEORGE GOYDER, THE DUTIES OF MASTERS 
AND SERVANTS 5 (1854) (servants owe "submission, integrity, faithfulness, and obedience"). 
283. As to the fate of the Chartists and their endeavour, see EDWARD ROYLE, CHARTISM 27 (3d 
ed. 1996). 
284. JAMES SCARLETT. LORD ABINGER, ADDRESS TO THE GRAND JURY AT THE LATE 
LEICESTERSHIRE ASSIZES 5-6 (London, John Murray 1839). He was in any event consistent, having 
previously avowed that if the franchise was expanded the Commons would overwhelm the Peers in the 
same manner that they had in France. SIX SPEECHES DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AT 
THE CLOSE OF THE DEBATE UPON THE REFORM BILL 25 (1831) (speech of Right Hon. John Wilson 
Croker). 
285. During his tenure as Chief Baron, the Court of Exchequer would continue to resist labour 
rights; further, he characterized the Chartists as a dangerous and disconcerting social element. See 
ERNEST MURRAY POLLOCK, LORD HANWORTH, LORD CHIEF BARON POLLOCK. A MEMOIR 102 
(1929). 
286. Lord A binger was vindicated by a wide vote of 228 to 73. 66 PARL. DEB., H. C. (3d ser.) 1037-
1143. Nevertheless, according to the hagiographical biography written by his son, the accusations of 
impropriety hounded the remainder of his judicial career. PETER CAMPBELL SCARLETT, A MEMOIR 
OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JAMES, FIRST LORD ABINGER, CHIEF BARON OF HER MAJESTY'S 
COURT OF EXCHEQUER 175-92 (1877). 
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own [free] will and judgment as to how he will employ his industry."287 
Following the 1831 Luddite riots against mechanisation, Baron Martin 
charged the jury that the Poor Law led "to early and improvident mar-
riages and the consequent forced increase of the population. "288 This 
perspective- that people both knew and received what they had bar-
gained for-also encouraged habitual neglect of occupational illness, the 
existence of which (when recognised at all) was viewed as part and parcel 
of individual employment contracts.289 
An absolute notion of Victorian class boundaries is elusive. Individu-
als often straddled more than one category, as in the case of highly remu-
nerated craftsmen or clerical workers; the ambitious and the fortunate 
could be upwardly mobile.290 Divisions, moreover, occurred within defined 
classes, such as the separation between the landed aristocracy whose wealth 
was of long standing, and those propelled into the upper echelons by newly 
garnered capitaJ.291 Nonetheless, a comprehensive survey on the topic 
found that the economic background of nineteenth-century judges arose 
from the professions, business interests, and land holdings.292 Moreover, 
the judiciary was uniformly "socially exclusive"; the median estate value of 
all English judges indicating that, no matter their precise social origin, those 
who sat the bench were clearly much wealthier than plaintiff servants and 
had very different concems.293 One must also bear in mind that when 
judges encountered working class people in the Queen's courts it was 
"usually either as criminals, or as witnesses-only very rarely as litigants" 
asserting civil law claims against social superiors.294 Thus, despite the rar-
ity of successful lawsuits by injured workmen, the judiciary held to the 
belief that liability was expansive and, if anything, ought to be reined 
in.295 
The absence of empathetic connection to the labourers was charac-
teristic of the upper class that the judiciary inhabited.296 This point is well 
287. R. v. Bailey, (1867) 16 L.T. 859. More restrained than Lord Abinger, Baron Bramwell's 
handling of the matter was lauded by Chief Justice Erie as head of a commission investigating the 
strike. CURTHOYS, supra note 245, at 83-84. 
288. CHARLES ALDERSON, SELECfiONS FROM THE CHARGES AND OTHER DETACHED PAPERS 
OF BARON ALDERSON 172 (1858). 
289. P.W.J. BARTRIP, THE HOME OFFICE AND THE DANGEROUS TRADES 30-33 (2003). 
290. See NEIL McCORD, BRITISH HISTORY 1815-1906 (1995). 
291. See generally id. at 99-107. 
292. DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL BENCH IN ENGLAND 1727-1875: THE RESHAPING OF A 
PROFESSIONAL ELITE 140 (1982). 
293. /d. at 178-79. 
294. A.W.B. SIMPSON, VICfORIAN LAW AND THE INDUSTRIAL SPIRIT 5 (1995) (reprinting Selden 
Society Annual Lecture). 
295. See, e.g., Lynch v. Marchmont, (1865) 29 J.P.R. 375, 376 (Judges ought to take great "care 
that the rule of law which is already wide enough is not stretched further."); Riley v. Baxendale, (1861) 
6 H. & N. 445, 448, 158 Eng. Rep. 183, 184 (stating that the laudable defence of common employment 
should not be "trenched upon"); Vose v. London & Yorkshire Ry. Co., (1858) 27 L.J. Ex. 249,252, 157 
Eng. Rep. 300, 303 (same, cautioning that the doctrine not be "frittered away"). 
296. Judicial lack of empathy to the lower classes was exacerbated by fear that a chaotic circumstance 
similar to that of the French Revolution would inexorably follow any meaningful empowerment of the un-
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illustrated in the publications of the period addressing the problem of 
poverty. The source of impoverishment was seen as a variety of negative 
social causes, including an overly generous Poor Law,297 ignorance of the 
value of thrift,298 lack of moral restraint (especially in regard to enthusias-
tic procreation),299 "profligate and libidinous saloons,"300 and inherent 
inequality.301 A hardhearted view of the "plight" of labourers was also 
shared. As stated with great authority (wholly unencumbered by factual 
distraction) by one pamphleteer, "the discomforts and privations which 
are said to oppress the working man, dismally set forth in catalogues 
woeful and lugubrious ... really are not so great or general as is be-
lieved."302 A similarly dismissive attitude extended to the British hunger 
riots of the 1830s and to the more than one million Irish deaths caused by 
the midcentury famine: their collective predicament was attributed to 
imprudent farming (and family) planning.303 The social divide was accu-
rately summarised by a character in future Prime Minister Benjamin Dis-
raeli's fiction, that "an impassable gulf divided the Rich from the 
Poor ... with no thoughts or sympathies in common."304 
In consequence, it hardly comes as a surprise that master/servant 
decisions are decidedly contrary in relation to culpability by employers 
for injuries to nonlabourers. In 1839, two years after the decision in 
Priestley, Lord Brougham explicated the rationale for the general principle 
of employers' vicarious liability to strangers. Masters are culpable because 
they could sever their servants' employment at will. By contrast, in "em-
ploying him I set the whole thing in motion; and what he does, being done 
for my benefit and under my direction, I am responsible for the conse-
educated masses, whether by universal enfranchisement, or through common-law rights. For a detailed 
account of social reaction to the French Revolution, see GEORG lOS V AROUXAKIS, VICfORIAN 
POLffiCAL THOUGHT ON FRANCE AND THE FRENCH (2002). 
297. See, e.g., ROBERT A. SLANEY, AN ESSAY ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE POOR, TO WHICH IS 
PREFIXED A LETTER BY THE AUTHOR TO JAMES SCARLETT 11 (1822) (characterising the support sys-
tem as a great incentive for the poor to throw themselves upon the parish). 
298. See, e.g., S. BROOKES, THOUGHTS ON THE POOR LAWS; WITH A PLAN FOR REDUCING THE 
POORS' RATES, PREPARATORY TO THEIR ABOLITION (1822) (urging that the poor be put to work and 
monetarily rewarded so that they could understand the benefits of prosperity). 
299. See, e.g., ANON., JUSTICE TO THE POOR; AND JUSTICE TO EVERY OTHER CLASS OF THE 
PEOPLE, AS RESPECfS THE SITUATION OF THE POOR, AND THE STATE OF AGRICULTURE AND 
COMMERCE 54 (1820); WM. LISLE BOWLES, THOUGHTS ON THE INCREASE OF CRIMES, THE 
EDUCATION OF THE POOR, AND THE NATIONAL SCHOOLS; IN A LETTER TO SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH 
7-10 (2d ed. 1819). 
300. WILLIAM CLARK, THOUGHTS ON THE MANAGEMENT AND RELIEF OF THE POOR; ON THE 
CAUSES OF THEIR INCREASE; AND ON THE MEASURES THAT MAY BE BEST CALCULATED TO AMEND 
THE FORMER AND CHECK THE LATTER 57-58 (1815) ("Let all public spectacles be restrained within 
the boundaries of chastity and decorum."). 
301. "The inequality which we observe in social life, result from corresponding inequality in the 
natural ... constitution of the human being." THOMAS LEWIN, THE RELATIVE DUTIES OF MASTERS 
AND SERVANTS: A BRIEF DISCOURSE. BY A MASTER OF A FAMILY AND J.P. FOR KENT 1 (1849). 
302. CHARLES WHITEHEAD, WHAT MAY BE DONE FOR THE POOR BY THE RICH 4 (1858). 
303. RAYMOND G. COWHERD, POLITICAL ECONOMISTS AND THE ENGLISH POOR LAWS: A 
HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF CLASSICAL ECONOMICS ON THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL 
WELFARE POLICY 182-201 (1977); BIGELOW, supra note 249, passim. 
304. BENJAMIN DISRAELI, SYBIL, OR THE TWO NATIONS 265 (London, MacMillian & Co. 1895). 
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quences."305 Logically, the same rationale should have controlled when ser-
vants acted improvidently on behalf of their employers but the resulting in-
juries were to fellow servants. In both cases, labourers acted for their mas-
ters' advantage and under their provenances.306 
More trenchantly, purely applied notions of political economy mili-
tated against liability for injuries to railway passengers because it was 
common knowledge that travel was dangerous. Both large-scale and 
lesser accidents were frequent, the more dramatic ones receiving exten-
sive newspaper coverage and calls for public collections in aid of vic-
tims.307 Nevertheless, English judges consistently upheld these damage 
claims, and passengers were not viewed as having bargained for their 
fares in proportion to undertaking a widely recognized perilous activ-
ity.308 Nor was it thought unjust that railways incurred different risk lev-
els and awarded disparate compensation in return for identically priced 
tickets (as in the case of passengers of different economic means travel-
ing in the same class of service), or that railways were also compelled to 
dole out identical awards in exchange for variant premiums (e.g., when 
passengers of the same economic means traveled in different classes of 
service). All three propositions flew straight in the face of the basic mar-
ket principles of free bargaining and correct pricing upon which political 
economy was founded. 
This imbalance is particularly acute in light of the hundreds of thou-
sands of pounds that railways annually compensated the estates of 
wealthier victims under the Fatal Accidents Act;309 amounts that could, in 
the view of railway attorneys, have been offset by the expedient of pas-
sengers taking out readily available accident insurance.310 As stated in a 
letter to Lord Campbell published by the attorney for the London & 
North West Railway Company, "[l]et a fair premium or consideration be 
paid, it matters not whether to the railway company or to a public insur-
ance office, and the pecuniary risk is provided for, on the only sound and 
equitable basis. "311 
305. Duncan v. Findlater, (1839) 6 CJ. & Fin. 910, 7 Eng. Rep. 940. 
306. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, 51 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1154-56 (1990), offers a parallel explanation for the expansion of preexisting com-
mon carrier liability to include railway passengers occurring at the same time that potential master/servant 
liability was quelled. 
307. For an overview, see KOSTAL, supra note 251, at 279-316. 
308. See generally HENRY PARRIS, GOVERNMENT AND THE RAILWAYS IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY BRITAIN (1965). 
309. EDWARD SMJRKE, A LETTER TO LORD CAMPBELL ON THE RATING OF RAILWAYS 7 (1851), 
pointed out that in the previous year actions under the namesake act had cost one railway alone 
£10,000. For tabulated annual compensation costs, see KOSTAL, supra note 251, at 294-95,305. 
310. Insurance was offered for a wide variety of matters, ranging from theft to venereal disease, 
and became more prevalent for railway passengers from 1840 onwards. See H.A.L. COCKERELL & 
EDWIN GREEN, THE BRITISH INSURANCE BUSINESS 1547-1970, at 47-50 (1976); HAROLD E. RAYNES, 
A HISTORY OF BRITISH INSURANCE 118-20 (1948). 
311. See, e.g., H. BOOTH, A LETTER TO THE RIGHT HON. LORD CAMPBELL ON THE 9 AND 10 
VICTORIA, CHAPTER 93, at 18 (1854). 
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Thus, in contrast to the judgments routinely handed down against 
workmen, English courts with equal constancy upheld passenger litiga-
tion versus railways, a situation from which judges could personally 
benefit.312 The Exchequer Barons, moreover, created a presumption of 
negligence in favour of injured railway passengers two years before Hut-
chinson and Wigmore.313 In the same year that they created the doctrine 
of common employment, the Court of Exchequer elaborated on that rul-
ing by declaring that "the fact of an accident having occurred was of itself 
prima facie evidence of negligence,"314 with Baron Alderson adding that 
it was "not necessary for the plaintiff to trace specifically in what the neg-
ligence consists. "315 It also bears noting that the first lawsuit on behalf of 
a passenger against a railway was heard in the Court of Exchequer one 
year after the decision in Priestley, yet parallel concerns about opening 
the courts to a floodgate of claims were not raised.316 
Finally, the influence of class perspective in channelling political 
economy may also be seen in the corresponding allocation of occupiers' 
liability which upheld a duty in negligence towards invited strangers or 
"invitees" but not to servants or other "agents" engaged on the prem-
ises.317 Not coincidentally, it was the Barons of the Exchequer who laid 
the groundwork for this parallel, two-tracked formulation.318 
B. Alternative Explanations 
Three alternative explanations drawn from the continuing debate over 
the evolution of American tort law lend insight into the course of the non-
development of employer/employee liability in nineteenth-century Eng-
land, but do not sufficiently explain the phenomenon. In turn, these are ju-
dicial restraint, the invisible hand hypothesis, and the subsidy theory. 
312. See generally KOSTAL, supra note 251, at 273-319. Indeed, writing to then-Prime Minister Glad-
stone, Queen Victoria described "the very alarming and increasing insecurity of the Railroads" as an im-
perative matter, for "the Queen's own family, not to mention her servants and visitors are in perpetual 
danger." Jonathan Simon, Edgework and Insurance in Risk Societies: Some Notes on Victorian Lawyers 
and Mountaineers, in EDGEWORK: THE SOCIOLOGY OF RISK-TAKING 203, 214 (Stephen Lyng ed., 2005). 
313. Grote v. Chester & Holyhead Ry., (1848) 2 Ex. 251, 255. 
314. Skinner v. London, Brighton S. Coast Ry., (1850) 5 Ex. 787, 789. 
315. !d.; see also Ayles v. Se. Ry. Co., (1868) 3 L.R. Ex. 146 (Chief Baron Kelly holding at both 
trial and on appeal to the Court of Exchequer, that the fact of one train running into another pre-
sented a prima facie evidence of negligence). 
316. See Bridge v. Grand Junction Ry., (1838) 3 M. & W. 244, 150 Eng. Rep. 1134. 
317. Indermaur v. Dames, (1867) 2 L.R.C.P. 311, 318. 
318. In Southcote v. Stanley, Chief Baron Pollock referred to the rationale of Priestley to deny a hotel's 
liability to a guest injured by a falling pane of glass. (1856) 1 H.&N. 247, 249-50, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195, 1197; 
see also Wilkinson v. Fairrie, (1862) 4 B. & S. 396, 158 Eng. Rep. 1038 (ruling by the Court of Exchequer 
that a servant sent on his master's business to a certain premises was not entitled to the same protection as a 
regular business customer). 
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1. Judicial Restraint 
One explanation that might be offered as to why workers found it 
more difficult to obtain compensation at common law than similarly 
harmed strangers lies in judicial restraint, a brand of jurisprudence in which 
judges apply existing precedent and do not create new law. Vicarious tort 
liability for injuries caused by servants to third parties was well established 
by the beginning of the nineteenth century under the legal maxim "qui facit 
per alium facit per se," that is "whoever does an act by the hands of another, 
shall be deemed to have done it himself."319 By contrast, the possibility of 
compensating an employee for a work-related accident was not raised until 
Priestley in 1837. Beforehand, with the narrow exception of servants being 
able to claim the remainder of annual wages for periods spent recuperating 
from illness or injury, the only legal redress available to incapacitated 
workers was that provided by their local parishes through the Poor Law 
system.320 It can therefore be argued that, in denying Charles Priestley's 
novel assertion of a master/servant duty of care, the Barons of the Excheq-
uer were juridically conservative, remaining constant to an existing com-
pensation system that did not recognise claims by injured employees. At 
the same time, and upholding the status quo, employers remained vicari-
ously liable for the claims of third parties wounded by their servants.321 
A number of factors demonstrate that the decisions of nineteenth-
century English courts, rather than manifesting restraint, were precipi-
tated by conscious choices to thwart employers' liability. First, judicial 
self-possession cannot explain the decision in Priestley. Notably, Lord 
Abinger unambiguously stated that lacking "precedent for the present 
action," the Court of Exchequer was at "liberty to look at the conse-
quences of a decision the one way or the other."322 This authority, to ei-
ther extend or constrict liability, was acknowledged by Baron Martin to a 
parliamentary committee. Common employment, he explained, was a 
"new rule of law" that did not exist as they deliberated in Priestley. 323 
When the "consequences" of augmenting liability for workplace injuries 
were envisaged as a litigation deluge that could, shockingly, rise to vicarious 
liability, the Barons of the Exchequer chose under the guise of "general 
principles" to avoid the ramifications of this new form of liability as too "in-
convenient" and "absurd."324 Thus, the basis of the denial of liability in 
319. Harold Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 108 (1916). 
320. See supra Part I. C. 
321. See generally Harry Smith, Judges and the Lagging Law of Compensation for Persona/Inju-
ries in the Nineteenth Century, 2 J. LEGAL HIST. 258, 259 (1981) (claiming that the approach taken by 
judges since Priestley may be "associated with conservatism"). 
322. Priestley v. Fowler, (1837) M. & H. 305, 307, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032. 
323. In later testimony, Lord Esher stated "that the law as to the non-liability of masters with re-
gard to fellow servants arose principally from the ingenuity of Lord Abinger in suggesting analogies" 
that could then be applied to other circumstances. W.C. SPENS & R.T. YOUNGER, THE LAW OF 
EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYED AS REGARDS REPARATION FOR PHYSICAL INJURY 66 (1887). 
324. Priestley, M. & H. at 307, 150 Eng. Rep at 1032. 
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Priestley was not fidelity to either doctrinal precedent or to the Poor Law as 
the socially sanctioned system of assistance, but to "general principles" of 
policy regarding the common law. Notably, Lords Abinger and Cranworth 
and Baron Alderson's assertions to the contrary, these principles were 
hardly universal. Although many American state courts adopted the doc-
trine of common employment (which they called the fellow servant rule), 
France, Italy, Germany-and Scotland-did not.325 
Second, judges often declined to apply or distinguish precedent to 
avoid extending employers' liability. When injured employees predicated 
claims for harm on the House of Lords's decisions in Paterson and Brydon, 
judges created exceptions to this duty, with Chief Baron Pollock character-
ising the ruling in Paterson as "obiter dicta."326 In addition, when Justice 
Byles and Chief Justice Erie sought to follow those decisions by exempting 
servants of unequal status from the doctrine of common employment, the 
suggestion was quickly reproved.327 This side-stepping of precedent, at a 
time when all courts were acknowledged as being bound by House of Lords 
decisions, demonstrates that employer/employee accountability was 
avoided because of consciously interpretive decision making, not as the re-
sult of conservative judicial reticence.328 
Third, and perhaps most telling, is that instead of extrapolating from 
established rules governing the allocation of employers' vicarious liability to 
third parties, England's judges proactively invented and reinstituted com-
mon-law defences to preclude servants' recovery against their masters. 
Specifically, it was the Court of Exchequer, and not defence counsel, that 
originated and then expanded the use of the doctrine of common employ-
ment.329 As well, it was the Barons of the Exchequer who invoked the de-
fence of volenti non fit injuria.330 Together, these common-law doctrines 
barred the majority of injured workers' claims. Given the quality of coun-
sel for defendants in Priestley, Hutchinson, and Banonshill Coal v. Reid, it 
cannot be plausibly asserted that the lawyers' reserve was due to a failure of 
skill.331 There simply were no common-law defences for these prestigious 
barristers to raise until the Court of Exchequer invented and applied them. 
325. See BIRRELL, supra note 86, at 56-QO; T. BEVEN, THE LAW OF THE EMPLOYERS' LIABIUTY 
FOR THE NEGUGENCE OF SERVANfS CAUSING INJURY TO FELLOW SERVANTS 4-{) (1880); see also SIR 
FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 114-15 (1882) (noting that common 
employment did not exist in Europe and was novel to Britain). 
326. Dynen v. Leach, (1857) 26 L.J. Ex. 221, 222. 
327. Wilson v. Merry & Cunningham, (1868) 1 L.R.S. & D. App. 326, 332; see also supra Part 
II.B.2. 
328. In Attorney-General v. Dean & Canons of Windsor, (1860) 8 H.L.C. 369, 369, 11 Eng. Rep. 472, 
472, Lord Chancellor Campbell categorically established that the Lords were constrained by their own 
precedent much in the same way as all lower courts were already known to be bound. The ruling was reit-
erated one year later in Beamish v. Beamish, (1861) 9 H.L.C. 274,274, 11 Eng. Rep. 735, 735. 
329. See supra Part Il.A. 
330. See supra Part III.C.l. 
331. See supra Part LA. 
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Consequently, judicial restraint does not explain the range of deci-
sions made by the nineteenth-century judiciary when allocating mas-
ter/servant liability for personal injuries. 
2. The Invisible Hand Hypothesis 
A second explanation that can be drawn from the debate over the ori-
gins of American tort doctrine to explain why nineteenth-century English 
judges resisted employer's liability is the efficiency of legal doctrine.332 Law 
and economics scholars, most notably Richard Posner, have argued that 
Anglo-American common law evolves towards economically efficient 
rules.333 This historical interpretation of how tort doctrine developed, also 
called the "invisible hand" hypothesis, posits that market driven efficiency 
guides judges in their decision making?34 Ironically, this is a notion with 
which the Victorians would have been comfortable, for it resembles a com-
monly held belief that organic substances, of which Law was one, evolve 
towards the best possible state.335 In the specific context of common em-
ployment and volenti non fit injuria, Judge Posner has argued that these de-
fences precipitated a regime in which wages were commensurate with 
risk.336 Labourers could elect between vocations receiving greater pay to 
encounter more hazard, and those remunerated at a lower level in return 
for safer conditions.337 He concluded that nineteenth-century workers 
were by-and-large "risk preferring" and had therefore decided for the 
former option.338 In consequence of the greater peril that was under-
taken, incentives were created for workers to mind themselves and their 
peers lest they be injured and uncompensated?39 This modern, retro-
spective rationale dovetails well with the rhetoric offered by English 
judges throughout the period, namely that it was the injured workers 
themselves who were best placed to know of and avoid hazards, and that 
they were paid wages commensurate with the running of these risks. 
Nevertheless, three flaws undercut the persuasiveness of an efficiency ra-
tionale.340 
332. Or, as Lord Mansfield stated (while still the advocate William Murray) in Omichund v. Barker, 
(1744) 1 Atk. 21, 33, the law "works itself pure" over time. 
333. "Judge made rules tend to be efficiency promoting." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 404-05 (2d ed. 1977). 
334. For further assertions of this theory, see John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evo-
lution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Effi-
cient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 651 (1977); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of 
Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). 
335. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL 
SELECilON (1859). 
336. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29,70 (1972). 
337. /d. 
338. /d. at 71. 
339. /d. at 69-71. 
340. See also ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAW (2005) (arguing that 
instead of being viewed as an organic, linear process, law should be understood as developing from a 
mixture of different processes, including serendipity). 
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The first shortcoming with the notion of efficiency determining the 
development of nineteenth-century English employer liability law is 
purely factual. The legal opinions are devoid of an indication that work-
ers knew of specific dangers arising from their employment or that they 
responded to these hazards by bargaining for higher wages. Instead, the 
rulings are predicated upon empirically unfounded, however deeply held, 
principles of political economy that were presumed as true.341 One could 
also point out that economic and social science data consistently reaches 
an opposite conclusion, namely, that employees (as well as other per-
sons) are generally risk averse.342 
The second and more trenchant shortcoming of a common-law effi-
ciency theory is the absence of evidence supporting the determination 
that a no-liability rule was (or is) more efficient than a regime holding 
employers strictly liable for injuries to their servants.343 The basic eco-
nomic principle of economy of scale makes it less expensive for large in-
dustries than for smaller ones to invest in safety and internalise accident 
costs. Moreover, the type of industry in question affects how frequently 
accidents occur, the level of risk, and the costs of prevention. Therefore, 
from an economic efficiency perspective "there is insufficient informa-
tion to identify the rule that properly allocates the risk of loss, and there 
is no reason a priori to assume that the same rule will work equally well 
in widely dissimilar contexts."344 In the same vein, no convincing ration-
ale has been put forward to establish why a higher wage/lower liability 
rule is ultimately more economically efficient than a lower wage/higher 
liability regime. There is also reason to believe that a system of greater 
compensation in lieu of reduced tort culpability may have less utility be-
cause it does not prevent human injury and its attendant social costs.345 
Further, what enquiries were made into the efficiency of competing 
legal regimes pointed in the opposite direction, towards employer liabil-
ity. The Benthamite reformer Sir Edwin Chadwick, for instance, en-
341. For a parallel contemporary assertion, see Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the 
"Hand Formula", 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 145, 145 (2003) (characterising Posner's arguments 
about an economic efficiency formula "based on speculative and implausible assumptions, overbroad gen-
eralisations, selective quotations, and superficial" case descriptions). 
342. Epstein, supra note 282, at 781, was the first to identify this flaw in the invisible hand theory. 
He has nevertheless very strongly and consistently advocated the position that workers are in fact 
knowledgeable about the risks incumbent in their employment, are guided by this knowledge in their 
occupational decisions, and should have autonomy to make those choices. For a contrary, empirical 
view that contemporary workers are largely unaware of their employment rights, see Pauline Kim, 
Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-
Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997). 
343. The debate may have begun in the nineteenth century, but continues through to the present 
day. Compare Jennifer Arlen & Bentley MacLeod, Beyond Master Servant: A Critique of Vicarious 
Liability, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 111 (Stuart Madden ed., 2005) (arguing that the common law was 
inefficient because it focuses on the principle's actual ability to control the agent, rather than its finan-
cial ability to do so), with Alan 0. Sykes. The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J.1231 (1984) 
(asserting that the rule created efficient effects). 
344. Epstein, supra note 282, at 781-85. 
345. /d. 
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gaged in a series of relatively sophisticated cost-benefit analyses that in-
cluded externalities. He determined that to reduce accidents and in-
crease utility, railways ought to be held strictly liable for injuries to their 
labourers.346 Chadwick clearly was not motivated to this conclusion by a 
pained social conscience that wished to redirect funds to injured work-
men-he was, after all, the driving force behind the New Poor Law and 
its economising measures. Nevertheless, Sir Edwin concluded that most 
accidents arose because of recklessness on the part of labourers rather 
than their "cupidity." In consequence, if railway owners and sharehold-
ers had to bear the cost, instead of labourers, the result would be greater 
care taken by subcontractors in their hiring practices and fewer inju-
ries.347 Moreover, such a rule would be economically more efficient be-
cause "the relief of the orphanage and widowhood consequent on the 
causalities in the construction of railways, has fallen upon the ratepayers 
of the parishes (frequently distant) in which the labourers who fall had 
settlements."348 When the total cost of labour was accounted for, includ-
ing working days lost to illness and premature mortality, Chadwick con-
cluded that the best course would be to not overwork labourers and to 
educate them to make intelligent choices, especially in relation to operat-
ing machinery.349 
3. The Subsidy Theory 
Finally, the divergence in treatment of injured employees and third 
parties in nineteenth-century England cannot be adequately explained by 
applying the American tort law "subsidy" theory to Victorian circum-
stances. Set forth initially by several commentators,350 the subsidy (or, legal 
instrumentality) principle's most powerful advocate has been Morton Hor-
witz,351 whose version has become predominant and is known to genera-
346. Similarly, one of his earliest cost-benefit forays, Chadwick recounted the unsanitary living 
conditions of the labouring classes, and argued for their improvement on the ground that healthier 
people lost less work time, live longer, and were less dependant on workhouses. POOR LAW 
COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE SANITARY CONDITION OF THE LABOURING POPULATION 254-76 
(1842). 
347. PAPERS READ BEFORE THE STATISTICAL SOCIETY OF MANCHESTER ON THE 
DEMORALISATION AND INJURIES OCCASIONED BY THE WANT OF PROPER REGULATIONS OF 
LABORERS ENGAGED IN THE CONSTRUCfiON AND WORKING OF RAILWAYS 19-21 (Edwin Chadwick 
ed.1846). 
348. 13 PARL. PAPERS 1846, at 434 (Select Committee on Railway Labourers). 
349. SIR EDWIN CHADWICK, MEETING OF THE BRITISH ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT 
OF SCIENCE, CAMBRIDGE OcrOBER 1862, ADDRESS ON THE MANUAL LABORER AS AN INVESTMENT 
OF CAPITAL 516 (1862). 
350. E.g., Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of 
Torts, 31 LA. L. REv. 1, 27 (1970); Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law 
of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 50, 65-66 (1967); Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence 
to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359,382 (1951). 
351. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERJCAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 67-108 
(1977). 
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tions of law students.352 In 1981, even its foremost critic acknowledged the 
subsidy theory as the "prevailing view of American tort history."353 Within 
the context of the development of the independent tort of negligence in 
nineteenth-century America, Horwitz maintains that judges "transformed" 
an existing common-law compensation rule that had remedied harms into 
one which "functionally or purposively" acted as "an instrument of policy" 
advancing the interests of industry by "forced subsidies to growth coerced 
from the victims of the process."354 Chief among the types of civil suits ex-
cluded in order to nurture emerging industry were those sustained by in-
jured workman.355 
In light of the manner in which English judges avoided the creation of 
employer/employee liability by refusing both general and specific mas-
ter/servant duties of care, and by originating the defences of common em-
ployment and volenti non fit injuria, the transatlantic application of the sub-
sidy theory may seem plausible. More so because in some cases English 
jurists overtly justified denying workmen's claims due to concern for the 
economic viability of business concerns if they were inundated by a deluge 
of litigation.356 Nonetheless, the subsidy theory has been strongly chal-
lenged on several grounds, three of which are pertinent in discrediting an 
instrumentality principle's application to nineteenth-century England.357 
To begin with, the subsidy theory assumes the existence of a com-
mon law of strict liability compensating accident victims that was im-
ported to colonial America, and later averted by state court judges. 
There are serious doubts about the presence of such a system in the 
United States.358 Nor has it ever been demonstrated to exist in England, 
where strict-like liability for injury was predicated on prescribed types of 
status relationships.359 Even more damaging is the issue of timing. Key 
to the subsidy theory is the proposition that American judges shifted the 
standard of liability at the height of economic development in the United 
States.360 By comparison, the rise of negligence as an independent tort in 
352. Wythe Holt, Morton Horwitz and the Transformation of American Legal History, 23 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 663,667-68 (1982) (lauding this method of historiography). 
353. Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpre-
tation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1717 (1981). 
354. HORWITZ, supra note 351, at xvi, 1, 3, 30. 
355. Seeid at1,30,67-108, 155. 
356. For instance, Chief Baron Pollock in Morgan v. Vale of Neath Railway Co., stating that "I 
will only add to the judgment which has been just delivered, that by a decision in favour of the plaintiff 
we should open a flood of litigation, the end of which no one could foresee." (1864) 5 B. & S. 736,742, 
122 Eng. Rep. 1004, 1006. 
357. See, e.g., John P.S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution-Some Lessons 
from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155 (1983); A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and 
the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 534 (1979). 
358. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 927 (1981) ("regard[ing) the view that the industrial era was dominated by a 
comprehensive theory of fault liability for unintended harm as largely a myth" based on "limited his-
torical evidence"). 
359. See supra Part I.A. 
360. HORWITZ, supra note 351,passim. 
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English common law did not occur until 1837, just after the end of the 
Industrial Revolution (1750-1830).361 One could counter this argument 
by asserting that English judges may not have been aware that the indus-
trial cycle had slowed, in particular because of intermittent railway 
booms. Although there is merit to contending that the judiciary may not 
have been precisely cognisant regarding the economic cycle, it still does 
not affect the core argument that incipient economic development, and 
especially railway growth, was not fostered. Hence the timeframe of the 
subsidy theory is unsuitable for England.362 
Also fatal to an English version of the subsidy theory is the fact that 
had judges wished to preserve the development of nascent industry they 
would have prevented both the extensive liability created by passenger liti-
gation detailed above, as well as heavy parish ratings against railways.363 
These latter were land-based tax assessments that funded a parish's Poor 
Law obligations. Clever (and greedy) parishes continued to apply the Paro-
chial Assessment Act, and in doing so were able to rate a railway's total 
income rather than the profits generated by the particular strip of railway 
running through the individual tariff-assessing parish.364 The conse-
quences were inequities in taxation of immense proportions, resulting in 
substantial tax relief for wealthier parish residents, including judges. In 
one instance complained of by Samuel Laing, chair of the London, 
Brighton & South Coast Railway Company, land that had previously 
been levied at less than one-half of one percent of the parish total now 
belonged to a railway paying one-third of the total Poor law assessment 
for that parish.365 Lord Campbell admitted that this situation was "ab-
surd" -a phrase that was evoked several times throughout the period to 
preclude master/servant liability- but courts nonetheless uniformly up-
held rating assessments against railways.366 
Because corporate defendants were not protected during their pe-
riod of growth, while railways were viewed as milch cows for parish tax 
assessments, American subsidy theory cannot explicate the preclusion of 
employees' suits for recompense against their masters in nineteenth-
century England. 
361. See DAVID S. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT 1 (1969). 
362. Sybil Jack & Adrian Jack, in Nineteenth-Century Lawyers and Railway Capitalism: Historians 
and the Use of Legal Cases, 24 J. LEGAL HIST. 59 (2003), argue that railways and other industries were, 
if anything, disadvantaged during this period. 
363. See generally KOSTAL, supra note 251, at 273-319. 
364. SAMUEL LAING, RAILWAY TAXATION 5-6 (1849). 
365. !d. at 5; see also SMIRKE, supra note 309, at 6 (asserting that until 1836 ratable assessments 
were always below value, but after the advent of the new Poor Law, railway assessments were always 
above value). 
366. WILLIAM EAGLE BOTT, LETTER TO LORD CAMPBELL, SUGGESTING ALTERATIONS IN THE 
LAW OF RATING RAILWAYS 3-6 (1856). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
During the last two decades of Victoria's reign, Parliament promul-
gated employers' liability through the Employers' Liability Act and two 
versions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.367 The effect of these meas-
ures on master/servant liability was not immediately positive. Courts inter-
preted statutory terms to the disadvantage of workmen and, more tren-
chantly, continued to apply common-law defences to preclude their 
demands. 368 
Despite judicial encumbrance, the legislation was beneficial for it in-
creased the variety, number, and successful likelihood of claims that injured 
labourers (and frequently their widows) could press against employers, and 
created leverage for out-of-court settlements.369 More importantly, the acts 
played a significant role in the evolution of twentieth-century British social 
policy. Largely as the result of early Parliamentary findings that the statu-
tory scheme had achieved its purpose without being ruinous to industry,370 
the legislation underwent fine tuning until after the Second World War, and 
was then subsumed into a national accident insurance plan.371 Thus, the 
statutes helped inaugurate the British system of state insurance as a public 
solution to widespread social problems. 
This Article presented the first analysis of the development of Victo-
rian era master/servant tort liability. While tracing that evolving jurispru-
dence, it demonstrated that English judges interpreted the law to prevent 
the emergence of employer accountability. In doing so, these judges cre-
ated the defence of common employment, widely applied the doctrines 
of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence, quashed nearly 
every innovative attempt to create law favourable to labourers, sub-
verted jury awards, and avoided House of Lords precedent that sup-
ported a limited form of liability. 
The Article demonstrated that the most complete account of why 
Victorian judges acted in this manner was the dominant influence of the 
intellectual schema of political economy. Further, it demonstrated that 
the established rationales for the parallel development of American tort 
law Uudicial restraint, the invisible hand hypothesis, and the subsidy the-
ory) supplement our knowledge but do not adequately explain the events 
depicted. By offering a comparative perspective into the debate over the 
development of American tort law, and illustrating the shortcomings of 
367. 1880,43 & 44 Viet., c. 42; 1897,60 & 61 Viet., c. 37; 1900,63 & 64 Viet., c. 22. 
368. Foremost among the disparagers of this system was legal commentator, later County Court 
Judge, A.H. Ruegg who characterised the legislation as "the best abused statute ever passed." ALFRED 
HENRY RUEGG, THE LAWS REGULATING THE RELATION OF EMPLOYER AND WORKMAN IN 
ENGLAND 147 (1905). 
369. See generally DAVID G. HANES, THE FIRST BRmSH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Acr, 1897, 
104-{)5 (1968). 
370. See, e.g., 88 PARL. PAPERS 2208 (1904) (reporting the findings presented by Sir Kenelm Digby's 
committee on Workmen's Compensation). 
371. National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946,9 & 10 Geo. VI, c. 62. 
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traditional interpretations when applied to the parallel English context, 
the Article challenged for a reinterpretation of this received wisdom. 
The account in this Article also has implications beyond its immediate 
subject. These types of historical inquiries are necessary to better appre-
ciate modern dilemmas over the salience of entrenched legal doctrines 
for unanticipated circumstances.372 Much like their predecessors in post-
Industrial Revolution England, contemporary American judges are 
asked daily to decide whether and how long-standing doctrines devel-
oped in an earlier age should be applied to rapidly emerging technologi-
cal innovations.373 Analysing how earlier judges approached similar chal-
lenges, as well as what motivated their decisions, lends insight to our 
modern-day struggles with similar quandaries. Finally, in presenting an in-
tellectual biography of a homogeneous judiciary, the Article raises ques-
tions about the diversity of contemporary judges and legal institutions. 
372. See supra text accompanying notes 8--9. 
373. See supra text accompanying notes 10-15. 
